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A MARKET RELIANCE THEORY
FOR FRAND COMMITMENTS AND OTHER PATENT PLEDGES
Jorge L. Contreras*
Abstract
Patent holders are, with increasing frequency, making public
promises to refrain from asserting patents under certain conditions, or to
license patents on terms that are “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND). These promises or “patent pledges” generally
precede formal license agreements and other contracts, but are
nevertheless intended to induce the market to make expenditures and
adopt common technology platforms without the fear of patent
infringement. But despite their increasing prevalence, current contract,
property, and antitrust law theories used to explain and enforce patent
pledges have fallen short. Thus, a new theory is needed to secure the
market-wide benefits that patent pledges can offer.
This Article proposes a novel “market reliance” theory for the
enforcement of patent pledges. Market reliance is rooted in the equitable
doctrine of promissory estoppel, but adds a rebuttable presumption of
reliance borrowed from the “fraud-on-the-market” theory under federal
securities law. Under this approach, a patent holder’s public commitment
is enforceable by any participant in the relevant market absent a showing
that it knowingly rejected the commitment. The market reliance theory
offers a robust means for enforcing legitimate patent pledges by thirdparty market participants, and it extends the effect of such pledges to
downstream purchasers of patents. As such, the market reliance theory
could fill a critical gap in the existing patent enforcement landscape and
give greater assurance to the technology markets that depend on them.
*
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[T]he incorporation of patented technology into a standard induces
market reliance on that patent and increases its value.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Because patent owners are not always well positioned to commercialize their
patented technology, they routinely cede all or a portion of their exclusive rights to
others through contractual licenses. Under a patent license, the patent owner agrees
not to enforce its rights against the licensee in exchange for some value, typically
including a monetary royalty. A vast network of licensing arrangements
characterizes modern markets for goods and services of all kinds, from electronics
and manufactured goods to pharmaceuticals and chemicals.
But today’s technology marketplaces have seen the emergence of new types of
promises concerning patents. These promises are not being made in written
agreements between business partners, but in public fora for the benefit of entire
markets. The most common of these promises is a commitment to license patents in
the future on terms that are “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND).
FRAND commitments have been most widely recognized in the context of
technical standards development. Standards such as Wi-Fi, USB, HTTP, and 4G
ensure that devices manufactured by different vendors can communicate and
interoperate with one another seamlessly and invisibly to the consumer.2 Most of the
standards used in the technology marketplace today are developed by groups of
engineers representing different market participants who collaborate, either in
person or virtually, at one or more standards development organizations (SDOs).3
Because SDO participants may obtain patents covering some or all aspects of a
technical standard, and because SDOs and their participants generally wish to
promote broad use and adoption of their standards, over the years SDOs have
developed policies to prevent their participants from enforcing patents to block the
use of the SDO’s standards or making such use so costly that the standards become
1
Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, Motorola Mobility LLC
& Google Inc., F.T.C. File No. 121-0120, at 2 (F.T.C. Jan. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Motorola
Mobility Proposed Consent Order Analysis], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/cases/2013/01/130103googlemotorolaanalysis.pdf, archived at http://perma
.cc/FG3T-CJL2.
2
For example, the 802.11 series of Wi-Fi® standards developed at the IEEE Standards
Association (IEEE) enable computers, tablets, smartphones, and other devices manufactured
by different vendors to communicate with each other in a manner that is essentially invisible
to the end user. See Kathy Kowalenko, IEEE 802 Committee Celebrates 30th Anniversary,
THE INSTITUTE (May 6, 2010), http://theinstitute.ieee.org/benefits/standards/ieee-802committee-celebrates-30th-anniversary668, archived at http://perma.cc/R23E-NY8X. So
long as two devices comply with the relevant 802.11 standard, they can communicate with
minimal user intervention. See id.
3
For a more detailed discussion of SDO structures and practices, see infra Part II.B.
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economically undesirable. One of the most prevalent of these policies requires SDO
participants to license their patents on FRAND terms to any manufacturer that
wishes to make a product complying with one of the SDO’s standards.4 As discussed
in more detail in Parts II.A and II.B below, FRAND commitments made in
conjunction with standards development are intended to assure the market that
licenses for any patents “essential” to the use of the standard will be available.5
While FRAND commitments today are most common in the SDO context, they
are now being made with increasing frequency outside of SDOs and standard setting.
Moreover, patent holders are making public promises beyond FRAND
commitments. These include commitments to refrain from asserting patents against
open source code and other technologies, 6 seeking remedies such as injunctive
4

See generally U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND
COMPETITION 46–47 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR]; Josh Lerner &
Jean Tirole, Standard-Essential Patents 2 (Toulouse Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. IDEI803, 2013) (“In an attempt to curb the monopoly power that they create, most [standardsetting organizations (SSOs)] require the owners of patents covered by the standard to grant
licenses on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms.”); Jorge L. Contreras,
Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Patent Licensing, 79
ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 50–51 (2013) (stating that FRAND commitments are the “most
prevalent” internal policies developed to “mitigate the[] risks” of patent holdup and
stacking).
5
A significant literature exists regarding the determination of which patents are
“essential” to implement a particular standard in a product. In many cases, SDOs permit
patent holders to self-identify patents that they believe to be essential. See RUDI BEKKERS &
ANDREW UPDEGROVE, A STUDY OF IPR POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF A REPRESENTATIVE
GROUP OF STANDARDS SETTING ORGANIZATIONS WORLDWIDE 34–47 (2012), available at
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/xpedio/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_072197.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/U6FN-XK2E; COMM. ON TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION,
AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PATENT POLICY MANUAL 67–85 (Jorge L.
Contreras ed., 2007) [hereinafter ABA PATENT POLICY MANUAL]; Jay P. Kesan & Carol M.
Hayes, FRAND’s Forever: Standards, Patent Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89
IND. L.J. 231, 294–304 (2014). But it is not necessarily the case that every patent that a patent
holder believes to be “essential” to the implementation of a standard will be infringed by a
product complying with the standard. In some cases, such patents may be found to be invalid.
In other cases, the scope of a standard or the patent claims may have changed from the time
that the patent was identified as essential by the patent holder. And in some cases, the patent
holder may simply be mistaken as to the essentiality of its patent to a standard or may adopt
an overly conservative strategy in declaring the essentiality of its patents. For all of these
reasons, “over-declaration” of patents in the standards-setting context is pervasive. See
Contreras, supra note 4, at 60–62.
6
Beginning more than a decade ago, IBM and other large firms began to pledge that
they would not assert substantial portfolios of patents against open source code software.
IBM, IBM STATEMENT OF NON-ASSERTION OF NAMED PATENTS AGAINST OSS (2005),
available at http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/pledgedpatents.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/3HS7-2ELG.
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relief,7 and transferring patents to nonpracticing entities.8 This Article refers to these
public, market-facing promises as “patent pledges,” and they are beginning to
dominate certain large and heavily litigated sectors of the global technology
marketplace.9
Though patent pledges are made by different means and with different outward
objectives, they share one key feature: they are intended to assure the market, rather
than specific firms, that the pledgor’s patents will not be used to block adoption of
a common technology platform. With such pledges in place, market participants are
more likely to make investments in the covered technology platforms. 10
Accordingly, it is critical that patent pledges, which offer essential assurances to the
market and its participants, be binding and enforceable.11 It is also critical that when
patents are transferred, existing patent pledges continue to bind the transferees.
Despite the increasing prevalence of patent pledges and their importance to the
economy, current legal theories do not adequately support the enforcement of these
promises. The principal theory used to enforce patent pledges to date, particularly in
the context of standards-related FRAND commitments, is rooted in the doctrine of
common law contract.12 The theory requires the conceptualization of patent pledges
7

In 2012, Apple, Microsoft, and Google each pledged not to seek injunctive relief
against implementers of certain standardized technologies to which they had previously
made FRAND commitments. David L. Newman, Availability of Injunctive Relief in Patent
Lawsuits as a Result of Standards Obligations, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (June
19, 2012), http://www.arnstein.com/documents/Availability-of-injunctive-relief-in-patentlawsuits_ThomsonReuters_6-19-12_Newman.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S2R9KL2X.
8
See, e.g., Mark Chandler, Good News for the Innovation Economy: The Tide’s
Turning
Against
Patent
Trolls,
FORBES
(Oct.
20,
2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2013/10/20/good-news-for-the-innovation-economy
-the-tides-turning-againt-patent-trolls/, archived at http://perma.cc/W4JF-SHAW (“Cisco in
the past sold a small number of patents to two [nonpracticing entities] . . . . But we won’t do
it again.”).
9
See Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, ARIZ. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 2–9); Non-SDO Patent Statements and Commitments, PROGRAM ON INFO.
JUSTICE & INTELLECTUAL PROP., http://www.pijip.org/non-sdo-patent-commitments/,
archived at http://perma.cc/DR8B-BKR7 (last updated Oct. 15, 2014) (cataloging more than
150 patent pledges covering thousands of patents).
10
See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing pretransaction investments by market participants).
11
As explained in Part IV.B.3, infra, I argue for the enforceability only of pledges made
with the intention of affecting market behavior. I refer to these as “actionable” pledges. See
Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 9 (manuscript at 34–35).
12
In this Article, I refer to “contract law” as the traditional Anglo-American common
law doctrine in which the existence of a contract is characterized by the presence of
consideration and a bargain between two or more parties. While other doctrines such as
promissory estoppel are addressed in first-year contract law courses as well as the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, I treat these equitable doctrines, which arose quite
separately from formal contract doctrine, as distinct. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 2.19, at 90–99 (4th ed. 2004); infra note 97.
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as contracts between patent holders and SDOs, as to which vendors wishing to
manufacture and sell products that comply with the standard (and thus infringe
patents essential to the standard) are third-party beneficiaries.13 While a number of
commentators14 and a handful of courts15 and agencies16 have adopted this contract13

See infra Part II.A.2.b. Though this Article characterizes patent holders and product
manufacturers as the two competing constituencies in debates over patent pledges, it is often
the case that single firms play both roles in these complex interactions. That is, a firm may
both hold patents covering a standardized technology (thus pledging to license its own
patents on FRAND terms) and manufacture products conforming to the standard (thus
requiring patent licenses from other patent holders).
14
See, e.g., Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the
Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 9 INT’L J. IT STANDARDS & STANDARDIZATION RES. 1, 3
(2011) (stating that “a FRAND obligation is solely the result of a voluntary contract entered
into by the patent owner on an identifiable date”); Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can
Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up,
Royalty-Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 101, 119 (2007) (“The
enforceability of the FRAND obligation results from the fact that it forms part of a private
agreement between an IPR owner and an SSO.”); Kassandra Maldonado, Breaching RAND
and Reaching for Reasonable: Microsoft v. Motorola and Standard-Essential Patent
Litigation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 419, 420 (2014) (arguing that Microsoft v. Motorola
“demonstrates the usefulness of contract law as the enforcement mechanism for the
[F]RAND commitment”); Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access LockIn: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 360 (2007) (stating
that “the [F]RAND promise, embedded in SSO bylaws to which participants agree, is
primarily a matter of contract law”). Even Professor Mark A. Lemley, who offers several
other theories under which to analyze FRAND commitments, ultimately concedes that
contract law, though not without its drawbacks, is likely the dominant analytical framework
for FRAND. See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1923–25 (2002).
15
See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-cv-178-bbc, 2012 WL 5416931,
at *4 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2012) (evaluating a dispute over a FRAND commitment as a breach
of contract); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (W.D. Wash. 2012)
(“The court agrees with Microsoft that . . . Motorola has entered into binding contractual
commitments to license its essential patents on RAND terms.”); Research In Motion Ltd. v.
Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 797 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (declining to dismiss RIM’s
breach of contract claim that Motorola failed to offer FRAND terms as promised to ETSI
and IEEE); Ericsson Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:06-CV-63, 2007 WL 1202728, at *1
(E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2007) (acknowledging that licensing obligations made to SDO were
contractual in nature and binding on all members). But see TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson
Tel. Co., 977 F. Supp. 2d 462, 470 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (finding that the working procedures of
the 3GPP standards group were “too indefinite to support the formation of a contract”).
16
Motorola Mobility Proposed Consent Order Analysis, supra note 1, at 3 (“These
commitments created express and implied contracts with the SSOs and their members.”). But
see Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities & Components Thereof, No.
337-TA-868, 2014 WL 2965327 (U.S.I.T.C. June 13, 2014) (Final) [hereinafter ITC
InterDigital Initial Determination] (finding that the standards body’s FRAND commitment
was not a contract).
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based theory, it falls short on a number of practical and theoretical grounds. Among
its shortcomings are its failure to account for the diversity of structures through
which patent pledges are made, and the inherent mismatch between the traditional
bilateral contract paradigm and the market-wide scope of such pledges. Relying on
contract theory as the framework for patent pledges stretches contract doctrine well
beyond its natural contours, leading both to under- and overinclusion of promises
that ought to be enforced and to a potential distortion of contract theory itself.
Common law contract is thus a poor framework for the analysis and enforcement of
patent pledges.
Antitrust law, too, has been proposed as a means for analyzing and enforcing
patent pledges. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in particular has
investigated and brought actions against several firms suspected of violating their
FRAND commitments.17 But, as discussed in Part III.C below, harm to competition
(as opposed to harm to particular competitors) may not always occur when patent
pledges are violated. And proving an antitrust injury has been challenging in the few
cases in which such theories have been tested.
Another theory that has been proposed to support the enforcement of patent
pledges is promissory estoppel.18 Estoppel, rooted in principles of equity, focuses on
the promise made by a patent holder and a market participant’s detrimental reliance
thereon, even if the other attributes of a common law contract (mutual assent and
consideration) are not present.19 Promissory estoppel is an attractive theory because
it emphasizes the patent holder’s reliance-inducing promise rather than a
hypothetical bargain between parties. Estoppel thus overcomes many of the
difficulties that contract doctrine faces in its application to patent pledges.
Nevertheless, a claim of promissory estoppel requires a showing that the promisee
actually and justifiably relied on the patent holder’s promise,20 a requirement that is
difficult to make in complex technology markets characterized by thousands of
patents and dozens of patent holders.
When courts and market participants adopt these theories for lack of anything
better, the result is an unstable foundation for these crucial commitments, an
incomplete conceptualization of the theoretical basis for their enforcement, and a
commitment structure that is vulnerable to opportunism and legalistic
gamesmanship. 21 Thus, a new theory is needed. The theoretical framework
supporting the enforcement of patent pledges should (a) be broad enough to work
across a diverse range of organizations and commitment types, (b) recognize the
17

See infra Part III.C.
See, e.g., Bryan James Mechell, Understanding Patent Non-Assertion Agreements:
The Enforceability of Microsoft’s Open Specification Promise, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 179, 197–99
(2008); Lemley, supra note 14, at 1915.
19
See infra Part III.B.
20
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); infra Part IV.B.1.
21
Opportunistic parties may attempt to couch their pledges in language intended to
refute the application of common law contract principles by, for example, stating that no
third-party beneficiaries are intended. See infra notes 130–132 and accompanying text.
18
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centrality of the promise made by the patent holder, and (c) reflect the public
character of patent pledges as fundamental elements of the broader technology
infrastructure. Accordingly, this Article proposes a new “market reliance” theory for
patent pledges that begins with the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel and
adds to it a rebuttable presumption of reliance adopted from the “fraud-on-themarket” theory under federal securities law. In short, a patent holder’s public
commitment either to refrain from enforcing its patents or to license its patents on
FRAND terms should be enforceable by any participant in the relevant market,
absent a showing that the commitment was knowingly rejected.22
The market reliance approach, which focuses on a patent holder’s promise to
the market at large, avoids the need to search for the formal attributes of contract
formation and specific reliance where none may be found. Shedding this doctrinal
baggage and recognizing patent pledges as the market-wide assurances they are
intended to be, whether through judicial interpretation or legislative enactment, will
create a stronger and more defensible foundation for the enforcement of these crucial
commitments.
This Article proceeds in three principal parts. Part II reviews the justification
for patent pledges and why they should be enforced as a matter of policy. The diverse
settings in which patent pledges are made, including FRAND and other
commitments made within and outside the standards-setting context, are also
reviewed. Part III assesses the theories that have been advanced to justify the
enforcement of patent pledges, including common law contract, promissory
estoppel, antitrust law, and equitable servitude, and discusses each of their
shortcomings as a general framework for analyzing patent pledges. Part IV develops
a novel market reliance theory for the enforcement of patent pledges that draws on
elements of promissory estoppel and the fraud-on-the-market theory recognized in
federal securities law. This Part also suggests how this theory can be implemented
in existing law.
22

This Article addresses the doctrinal “glue” that gives effect to FRAND commitments
and other patent pledges without attempting to solve the complex question of the “meaning”
of a FRAND commitment. This question has been debated extensively in the literature,
including in the author’s previous work. For recent academic commentary on the content and
substance of FRAND commitments, see, for example, PATENT CHALLENGES FOR
STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 52–69 (Keith Maskus & Stephen A. Merrill
eds., 2013) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]; Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, An
Economic Interpretation of FRAND, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 531, 532–34 (2013);
Contreras, supra note 4, at 51–54, 92; Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing
Negotiations in Standard-Setting Organizations, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 858–59 (2011);
Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations:
Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 672 (2007); Doug
Lichtman, Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1032–35 (2010);
Miller, supra note 14, at 357–61; J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I:
Royalties, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 931, 951–54 (2013); Daniel G. Swanson & William
J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and
Control of Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 5–7, 16 (2005);.
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II. FORM AND FUNCTION OF PATENT PLEDGES
This Part offers a brief description of patent pledges and their function in
technology-driven markets. Part II.A outlines the public welfare benefits that such
pledges create, supporting the argument that patent pledges should be legally
recognized and enforced. Parts II.B and II.C describe the spectrum of forms that
patent pledges, particularly FRAND commitments, take. Part II.D addresses the
need for patent pledges to be legally enforceable, both against the original pledger
and subsequent owners of pledged patents.
A. The Public Character of Patent Pledges
The patent system as authorized by the U.S. Constitution is endowed with a
public character: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”23 Its primary
purpose is not to reward individual inventors, but to benefit the public as a whole. A
growing number of scholars have recognized the social welfare benefits of the patent
system as dominant over the private rewards that patents may afford to patent
holders.24 Likewise, the making and enforcement of patent pledges is not simply of
concern to the individual patent holder and its prospective licensee, but to the market
more broadly. Because of the market-wide nature of patent pledges, they take on a
public character that must be considered when analyzing their enforceability. This
public character, and the need to enforce patent pledges, is often discussed in terms
of efficiency and social welfare, covered in Part II.A.1, but also implicates broader
notions of justice and fairness, which are described in Part II.A.2.
1. Market-Wide Benefits and Network Effects
Though patent pledges are made by different means with different outward
objectives, they share one key feature: they are intended to assure the market, rather
than specific firms, that the pledgor’s patents will not be used to block adoption of
a common technology platform. The most direct application of this principle arises
23

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 326–30 (2003); Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public
Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 42–47 (2012) (arguing that patent litigation, in general,
has a public character); Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92
TEX. L. REV. 517, 519 (2014) (“Patent law . . . is not designed to remedy private wrongs.
Rather, its major aim is to promote innovation.”); Stephen Yelderman, CoordinationFocused Patent Policy 3–4 (Aug. 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2481025, archived at http://perma.cc/E
4LM-A6C7 (“In recent years, . . . [s]cholars have . . . observed a variety of other purposes
that may be served by the patent system beyond simply rewarding inventive
accomplishment.”).
24
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in the case of interoperability standards, which enable different vendors’ products
and services to work together. Interoperability standards, when widely adopted, can
give rise to positive externalities known as network effects that benefit not only the
vendors of standardized products but also consumers, competitors, and innovators.25
As observed by Professors John Palfrey and Urs Gasser, “[S]ome degree of
interoperability is necessary if a product is to thrive in the information technology
marketplace.” 26 Interoperability, they argue, enhances consumer choice, enables
user creativity, fosters competition in the marketplace, and promotes innovation.27
Courts and regulators have also recognized the public welfare benefits of
technical interoperability standards. 28 As explained in a joint report by the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FTC, “Industry standards are widely
acknowledged to be one of the engines of the modern economy. Standards can make
products less costly for firms to produce and more valuable to consumers.”29 As

25

See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424–25 (1985) (noting that “[t]here are many
products for which the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good increases
with the number of other agents consuming the good”); BRETT M. FRISCHMANN,
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 87–90 (2012); CARL
SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK
ECONOMY 45–46 (1999); see also Richard S. Whitt, A Deference to Protocol: Fashioning a
Three-Dimensional Public Policy Framework for the Internet Age, 31 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 689, 722 (2013) (stating that “the technical standards and protocols . . . that define
how the Internet and World Wide Web function—all constitute exclusively public goods,
free for everyone to use without access restrictions”).
26
JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, INTEROP: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF HIGHLY
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 28 (2012).
27
Id. at 58–59, 70–72, 89–90, 111.
28
See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217,
at *5–7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (“Standards lower costs by increasing product
manufacturing volume, and they increase price competition by eliminating switching costs
for consumers who want to switch from products manufactured by one firm to those
manufactured by another.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE:
ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 191 (2011) [hereinafter FTC,
EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE] (“In many IT industries, interoperability among products and
their components is critical to developing and introducing innovative products that satisfy a
range of consumer needs.”); Renata B. Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Address at the 2nd Annual Antitrust Law Leaders Forum: IP, Antitrust and
Looking Back on the Last Four Years 16 (Feb. 8, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/292573.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AY6N9VW6 (“[S]tandards serve the public interest in many ways and collaboratively-set industry
standards may substantially reduce transaction costs . . . . [And] standards offer our economy
great efficiencies and offer consumers and businesses new, advanced products . . . .”).
29
2007 DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR, supra note 4, AT 6–7; see also Herbert
Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 B.C. L. REV. 87, 89–91
(2007) (describing various social welfare benefits provided by standards).
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such, interoperability standards have become indispensible infrastructural elements
of the modern technology ecosystem.30
Similar arguments have been made with respect to the adoption of open source
software. The broad availability of common open source platforms can give rise to
significant market-wide cost savings and efficiencies. 31 Widely available open
source platforms such as the Linux and Android operating systems, promoted by
many patent holders’ commitments not to assert their rights against these
technologies, have led to the emergence of robust new markets for compatible
software and hardware product offerings.32 In this sense, pledges in which patent
30

Professor Brett Frischmann describes infrastructural resources as those that (1) may
be consumed nonrivalrously over an appreciable range of demand, (2) are subject to demand
driven primarily by downstream productive activities that require the resource as an input,
and (3) may be used as an input into a wide range of goods and services. FRISCHMANN, supra
note 25, at 61. Technical interoperability standards, which are used in a wide range of
downstream products, but are not themselves the end goal of consumption, fit this
description. Professor Frischmann also distinguishes among commercial, public, and social
infrastructural elements. Id. at 67–71. While technical standards are generally provisioned
by the private sector, they have the character of public goods (a characterization supported
by Dieter Ernst, America’s Voluntary Standards System—A “Best Practice” Model for
Innovation Policy? 29–30 (East-West Ctr. Working Papers, No. 128, 2012)). Accordingly,
Professor Frischmann’s observations regarding the problems inherent in supplying public
goods, FRISCHMANN, supra note 25, at 69–70, and his proposed approach to addressing their
undersupply, misallocation, and misoptimization through commons resource management
strategies, id. at 108–14, may be applicable to technical standards. In fact, Frischmann’s
“basic lesson” that “[w]hen an infrastructure resource serves as a foundation for the
production of a wide variety of public and/or social goods, managing access to and use of
that resource in a manner that does not discriminate in price, quality, or priority among users
or uses may be an efficient and politically attractive public strategy,” id. at 113, sounds
remarkably like a FRAND approach, cf. Greg R. Vetter, Open Source Licensing and
Scattering Opportunism in Software Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 225, 226–27 (2007)
(classifying standards relating to software as “a type of technology semicommons”);
Timothy Simcoe, Governing the Anti-Commons: Institutional Design for Standard Setting
Organizations (July 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Utah Law Review)
(analyzing technical standard setting within Elinor Ostrom’s shared resource (“commons”)
framework).
31
See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 31–32 (2006); Dirk Riehle, The
Economic Case for Open Source Foundations, COMPUTER, Jan. 2010, at 86, 87–88.
32
See, e.g., Elliot Maxwell, Open Standards, Open Source, and Open Innovation:
Harnessing the Benefits of Openness, INNOVATIONS, Summer 2006, at 119, 132–33
(discussing the main streaming of open-source software); Bradley M. Kuhn, The State of
Free Software in Mobile Devices, OPEN SOURCE BUS. RESOURCE, Mar. 2010, at 32, 33–34,
available at http://timreview.ca/sites/default/files/Issue_PDF/march10_osbr.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/M2VP-DCT8 (“From Google’s point of view, an easy-to-adopt, licensingunencumbered platform will broaden their market. . . . Google wants to see Android adopted
broadly in both Free Software and mixed Free/proprietary deployments.”); David A.
Wheeler, Why Open Source Software/Free Software (OSS/FS, FLOSS, or FOSS)? Look at
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holders commit not to assert their patents, or to license them on FRAND terms,
function in a manner similar to open source copyright licenses that permit free
modification and redistribution of software products.33
Another way that patent pledges benefit the market is by encouraging potential
licensees to make costly investments prior to the formalization of license
agreements, thereby accelerating market adoption of standardized technologies and
platforms. Such investments include product design and development, marketing,
materials, capital equipment, information technology, employee training, and supply
chain management.34 Once such investments have been made, the potential licensee
is said to be “locked-in.” In other words, after lock-in it will be less likely to switch
to an alternative technology due to the amount it has already invested in the patented
technology. Not surprisingly, lock-in gives the patent holder substantial leverage in
subsequent license negotiations, a phenomenon that has been termed patent “holdup.”35 To encourage beneficial prelicense investment by potential licensees, patent
holders make pledges, and it is thus important to require patent holders to abide by

the Numbers!, DWHEELER.COM (May 8, 2014), http://www.dwheeler.com/oss_fs_why.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/BGN4-3D9H.
33
See, e.g., Ravi Sen et al., Open Source Software Licenses: Strong-Copyleft, NonCopyleft, or Somewhere in Between?, 52 DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 199, 199 (2011) (“Open
source development avoids the inefficiencies of a strong intellectual property regime and can
create at least as much total welfare as traditional closed licenses.” (citations omitted)).
34
See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 25, at 116–30. Professors Alan Schwartz and
Robert E. Scott have observed that in the context of construction contracts, both parties may
make precontracting investments. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability
and Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 690–91 (2007). However, investments
made by the parties are often unbalanced, tipping more heavily toward the buyer, and
individual incentives often lead a seller to wait for the buyer to make its initial investment
before it invests, giving the seller an opportunity to renegotiate after the buyer has already
sunk costs into the project (i.e., an analog to the problem of holdup). Id. Enforcing
precontracting commitments enables the buyer to make these investments with some
confidence that the seller will not subsequently back out of the transaction, rendering their
initial investments valueless.
35
See, e.g., Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 616 (2007) (discussing holdup as a problem in the context of
cooperative standard setting); Lichtman, supra note 22, at 1033 (arguing that the purpose of
RAND commitments is to decrease instances of exaggerated royalties due to a holdup in
negotiations).
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these pledges. 36 As one major SDO explains, such commitments “help protect
implementers of a standard against patent hold-up.”37
Patent pledges play a crucial role in preserving the public benefits generated by
common technology platforms. They assure market participants that patents will not
be used to block the manufacture or sale of products conforming to a standard or
open specification, or containing open source code. As the federal district court
observed in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,38 such commitments are essential to
support the widespread implementation of standards and preserve the broad
interoperability benefits that they confer. 39 Accordingly, patent pledges, like the
standards and common technology platforms that they support, have an inherently
public, welfare-enhancing character and, as such, should be enforced.40
2. The Moral Force of Promise
In addition to economic and welfare enhancement rationales for enforcing
patent pledges, more fundamental arguments regarding fairness and the moral
weight of promises can also be brought to bear. Early courts in equity are said to
have enforced promises based on the notion that giving one’s word created a binding
and enforceable obligation.41 Hume reasoned that “the external sanction of public
36

See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar, Moving Past the SEP RAND Obsession: Some
Thoughts on the Economic Implications of Unilateral Commitments and the Complexities of
Patent Licensing, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1093, 1101 (“When investment decisions are
made in reliance on pledges for good faith dealings in the marketplace at some later date,
those pledges should be upheld, regardless of whether the pledges are made by innovative
firms in R&D or by downstream firms in commercialization.”).
37
Standards Essential Patent Disputes and Antitrust Law: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust Competition Policy & Consumers Rights of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 12 (2013) (written statement of the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) Standards Association), available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/7-30-13KulickTestimony.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/XW6P-T4K3; see also 2007 DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST & IPR, supra note 4, at
46–47 (“Some SSOs use licensing rules, such as requiring IP holders to commit to licensing
on RAND terms, to mitigate holdup.”).
38
No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
39
See id. at *5–7, *10–11.
40
Of course, not all patent pledges are directed toward the same types of market
benefits, and some types of pledges may confer fewer benefits than others. For example,
several large patent holders have recently pledged not to transfer patents to nonpracticing
entities or patent “trolls.” See Chandler, supra note 8. While market benefits may, indeed,
flow from such nontransfer pledges, such benefits would, at a minimum, be of a different
character than pledges relating to the licensing of patents on FRAND terms (the author
thanks Professor Greg Vetter for this insight). This Article focuses primarily on pledges that
promote the interoperability of products and technology platforms.
41
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, § 1.5, at 12. But see id. §§ 1.4–1.5, at 9–12 (noting
that neither Roman law nor early common law courts adopted the view that promises were
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opprobrium, of loss of reputation for honesty, which society attaches is promisebreaking, is internalized, becomes instinctual, and accounts for the sense of the
moral obligation of promise.”42 In the early twentieth century, Roscoe Pound wrote
that the “moral sentiment of the community” compels the keeping of promises in
good faith,43 and Professor Morris R. Cohen, even while resisting early twentieth
century theories about the all-encompassing nature of contract law, grudgingly
acknowledged that “there is something inherently despicable about not keeping a
promise, and that a properly organized society should not tolerate this.”44
Among the most prominent contemporary thinkers about the underpinnings of
our system of justice is John Rawls, who reasoned that
while we normally think of moral requirements as bonds laid upon us, they
are sometimes deliberately self-imposed for our advantage. Thus
promising is an act done with the public intention of deliberately incurring
an obligation the existence of which in the circumstances will further one’s
ends. . . . Having, then, availed ourselves of the practice for this reason,
we are under an obligation to do as we promised by the principle of
fairness.45
And more recently, Professor Charles Fried has argued that the obligation to
keep one’s promise is grounded in notions of individual autonomy and trust. “An
individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally
invoked a convention whose function it is to give grounds—moral grounds—for
another to expect the promised performance.”46
While U.S. law surrounding promises, primarily contract and promissory
estoppel, does not explicitly rely on any moral principle underlying the nature of

per se enforceable); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 574
(1933) (“At various times it has been claimed that mere promises as such received legal force
in Hebrew, Greek, early German, and canon law. None of these claims can be justified.”).
42
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
15 & n.10 (2d ed. 2015) (discussing DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 516–25
(L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1888)).
43
ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 237 (1922).
44
Cohen, supra note 41, at 571. But see id. at 572 (“But while this intuitionist theory
contains an element of truth, it is clearly inadequate. No legal system does or can attempt to
enforce all promises.”).
45
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 347 (1971). This Article is not the first to invoke
Rawls in discussing the fundamental basis for FRAND commitments. See Sidak, supra note
22, at 1032 (describing the “Rawlsian depiction of standard setting as a process evolving
from an original position of ignorance with respect to whether one will eventually be buying
or selling patented technology”).
46
FRIED, supra note 42, at 16.
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promising,47 the laws of some European jurisdictions allow the enforcement of socalled “unilateral” promises based on “the moral need for the promisor to adhere to
the promise, and the moral impetus to protect a promisee harmed by a broken
promise.”48 This principle is also reflected in the Principles of European Contract
Law and the Draft Common Frame of Reference, which describe the subjective
requirement for a unilateral juridical act, the relevant factor being the consent or will
of the promisor rather than reliance by the promisee.49 For all of these reasons, there
is a strong moral impetus driving the enforcement of promises that exists in addition
to the more instrumental arguments usually marshaled in its favor.
B. The Range of Patent Pledges
Patent pledges take many forms and are made in a variety of settings.50 Perhaps
the most common of these structures, or at least the one that most commentators and
courts have focused on, are those commitments made by patent holders within the
standards-setting context to license their patents on terms that are “fair, reasonable
and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND). FRAND commitments, as noted in the
Introduction, are intended to assure the market that patent licenses will be available
to manufacturers of standardized technologies on terms that are, at least roughly,
understood.51 The legal mechanisms by which FRAND commitments are made vary
considerably. 52 Moreover, the structures of SDOs themselves are surprisingly
diverse, ranging from small groups of firms focusing on a single product category
to large, international bodies that produce standards in a broad range of industries.53

47

But see Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE
L.J. 111, 111 (1991) (arguing that the U.S. doctrine of promissory estoppel is more firmly
rooted in notions of promise than reliance).
48
David V. Snyder, Hunting Promissory Estoppel, in MIXED JURISDICTIONS
COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND SCOTLAND 281, 283 (Vernon Valentine
Palmer & Elspeth Christie Reid eds., 2009) (discussing unilateral promise under Scots law).
49
Id. at 297.
50
See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 9 (manuscript at 15–21).
51
See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 28, at 22 (“One way that many
SSOs attempt to address [patent hold-up] is through licensing rules that require participants
to agree to license patents on [FRAND] terms.”); ABA PATENT POLICY MANUAL, supra note
5, at xiv.
52
See ABA PATENT POLICY MANUAL, supra note 5, at 67–68 (describing variants by
which licensing commitments are imposed); Lemley, supra note 14, at 1955–57 (speculating
that the diversity among SDO IP policies is likely due to lack of coordination, low
prioritization of IP issues, and other exigencies, but least of all to intentional design).
53
See generally Brad Biddle et al., The Expanding Role and Importance of Standards
in the Information and Communications Technology Industry, 52 JURIMETRICS 177, 181–91
(2012) (describing structural variation among SDOs); Ernst, supra note 30, at 12 (presenting
a taxonomy of standardization groups).
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This Part describes the range of structures in which patent pledges (typically
FRAND commitments) are made. A summary is provided in Table 1 below, ordered
from the most to the least formal54:
Table 1
Patent Pledge Structural Variants
Commitment
Structure

Characteristics

Prevalence

1. Multilateral
Agreement

Agreement among members
expressly containing a commitment

2. Membership
Agreement

SDO membership agreement contains Uncommon Bluetooth SIG56
or requires compliance with a
OASIS57
specified commitment

3. SDO
Bylaws/Policy

SDO bylaws or other policy
documents require members to
comply with a specified commitment

54

Rare

Examples
USB Promoters
Group55

Uncommon VITA58
ETSI59

This list is not intended to be comprehensive. Moreover, several of these variants can
coexist within the same SDO leading to hybrid structures. See generally Biddle et al., supra
note 53, at 190–91 (discussing hybrid structures and other models); BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE,
supra note 5, at 27–30 (describing the policy commitment structures of ten SDOs studied).
Estimates of prevalence are based on data compiled in Biddle et al., supra note 53; BEKKERS
& UPDEGROVE, supra note 5; Lemley, supra note 14, at 1904–06; and the author’s personal
observations.
55
Biddle et al., supra note 53, at 182 (“The USB Promoters Group, a contractual
arrangement between a small group of major ICT companies, acts as steward for the USB
specifications . . . .”).
56
Bluetooth Patent/Copyright License Agreement, BLUETOOTH TECH. SPECIAL
INTEREST GRP., https://www.bluetooth.org/login/register/, archived at https://perma.cc/4LK
5-S6DH (follow the “Patent & Copyright License Agreement (PDF)” hyperlink) (last visited
Jan. 17, 2015).
57
Membership Application and Agreement, OASIS (Jan. 20, 2005), https://www.oasisopen.org/join/membership-agreement.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/YDW6-EAHC (“The
Member agrees to abide by the terms of (a) the IPR Policy of OASIS . . . as of the Effective
Date or as amended thereafter pursuant to . . . this Agreement, and (b) any other policies
developed by the Board in accordance with the Bylaws (“Policies”) applicable to members .
. . .”).
58
VITA Membership Application, VITA, http://vita-beta.com/home/Membership/VITA
_Member_Registration_Form_2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S2SS-NYZY (last
visited Jan. 21, 2015) (“By submitting this application, the company and its representative(s)
agree to adhere to all VITA and VSO policies and procedures.”).
59
EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., ETSI RULES OF PROCEDURE 36 (2014)
[hereinafter ETSI IPR POLICY], available at http://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-iprpolicy.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T459-TFVN (outlining ETSI’s intellectual property
rights policy).
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Characteristics

[NO. 2
Prevalence

Examples
HDMI Forum60

4. Follow
American
National
Standards
Institute (ANSI)
Policy

SDO requires members to comply
with the ANSI patent policy

5. Letters of
Members must deliver written
Assurance (LOA) statements of their FRAND
commitments, if any, at certain points
during the standardization process
6. Voluntary
SDO
Declarations

60

Members are given the option to
declare their intentions or
commitments

Common61 ASTM62

Common

Rare

ITU/ISO/IEC63
IEEE64

IETF65

BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 5, at 27; RUDI BEKKERS & ANDY UPDEGROVE,
SUPPLEMENT 9—ANALYSIS OF THE IPR POLICY OF HDMI FORUM (2012), available at
http://home.tm.tue.nl/rbekkers/nas/Bekkers_Updegrove_NAS2012---S09---HDMI_Forum.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T5CX-HAEE.
61
This structure is prevalent in ANSI-accredited SDOs outside the ICT sector. See infra
note 74.
62
ASTM INT’L, REGULATIONS GOVERNING ASTM TECHNICAL COMMITTEES § 15.4
(2013) (“ASTM standards submitted to ANSI for approval as American National Standards
shall conform to the ANSI patent policy.”).
63
Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC, ITU, http://www.itu.int/en/ITUT/ipr/Pages/policy.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/BUR4-CUFK (last visited Jan. 21,
2015); Patent Statement and Licensing Declaration Form for ITU-T or ITU-R
Recommendation, ITU (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/oth/04/04/T04040
000020003PDFE.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XK4Z-CPBX.
64
IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS § 6.2 (2015), available at
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/6UE3-XREX (“If the IEEE receives notice that a [Proposed] IEEE Standard may require
the use of a potential Essential Patent Claim, the IEEE shall request licensing assurance . . .
from the patent holder or patent applicant.”); Letter of Assurance for Essential Patent Claims,
IEEE, § D.1.b, https://development.standards.ieee.org/myproject/Public/mytools/mob/loa.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Y5JP-3NPE (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) [hereinafter IEEE
LOA] (demonstrating that a patent holder may also indicate that it is unwilling to license,
that it will license at no charge, or that it will license at a royalty rate not to exceed a specified
amount).
65
Scott Bradner, Intellectual Property Rights in IETF Technology § 6.5 (Internet Eng’g
Task Force Network Working Grp., Request for Comments No. 3969, 2005), available at
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3979.txt, archived at http://perma.cc/D8VS-5RNQ (“[I]t is
helpful if an IPR disclosure includes information about licensing of the IPR . . . .”).
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Prevalence

Examples

Uncommon Microsoft
but
Interoperability
increasing Principles66

(1) Multilateral Agreement: Some SDOs exist solely as contractual
arrangements among the participants. These “contractual consortia” typically have
a limited, focused membership and a specific technical goal. 67 FRAND
commitments among members are often found in the contractual agreements
establishing these groups.
(2) Membership Agreement: In SDOs that are formed as incorporated entities,
participants may be required to sign a written membership agreement with the SDO.
This agreement may contain an express FRAND commitment or incorporate a
FRAND commitment that is contained in either the SDO’s bylaws or a separate
policy document.68
(3) SDO Bylaws/Policy: Many SDOs have no formal membership agreements,
but include FRAND commitments in their bylaws or policy documents.69 In some
cases, participants are required to agree to comply with such bylaws and policies in
a membership application (often submitted online), or compliance may simply be
understood as an incident of membership in the organization. 70 In some cases,
FRAND commitments arise only when a participant joins a particular working group
or technical activity, and commitments may vary by group or activity.71
(4) Follow American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Policy: All SDOs that
wish to be accredited as developers of American National Standards72 must comply
with ANSI’s “Essential Requirements.” The ANSI Essential Requirements permit
66

Interoperability Principles, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/openspecificat
ions/en/us/programs/interop/interoperability-principles/default.aspx,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/69JD-BACG (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
67
See Biddle et al., supra note 53, at 186–87 (describing and providing examples of
such “contractual consortia”).
68
See id. at 188–89 (describing and providing examples of “incorporated consortia”).
69
See id. at 196–97; Lemley supra note 14, at 1906.
70
See infra notes 104–107 and accompanying text (discussing the binding nature of
corporate bylaws and SDO attempts to impose contractual structures absent signed
agreements).
71
See BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 5, at 28 (noting that such SDOs have a
relatively narrow technical scope).
72
There are various reasons that SDOs wish to obtain ANSI accreditation, including
reputational value, acceptance within the broader standardization community, attraction of
new members, representation at ANSI and ability to influence ANSI policy, and acceptance
of standards by governmental bodies. See Why Seek Accreditation?, ANSI ACCREDITATION
SERVICES,
https://www.ansica.org/wwwversion2/outside/Benefits.asp,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/GLR7-2LDR (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
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American National Standards to include technologies covered by known patents, so
long as the relevant SDO receives a written assurance from the patent holder that a
license will be made available either without consideration or “under reasonable
terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination.”73 The
large majority of SDOs, particularly those in fields other than information and
communications technology (ICT), simply reference the ANSI policy in their own
membership agreements, bylaws, or policies, rather than adopt a patent policy of
their own.74
(5) Letters of Assurance (LOA): SDO rules and procedures may require
participants to submit a written document (referred to variously as a “letter of
assurance,” “licensing declaration,” or “written assurance”) stating their intentions
regarding the licensing of standards-essential patents. 75 Different SDOs require
participants to submit such LOAs at different times during the standardization
process, including at the time potentially essential patents are disclosed, prior to
voting on a standard, or upon request of the SDO.76 Often, such letters must conform
to a standardized format and allow the participant to check one of several boxes to
indicate whether its preferred licensing approach is FRAND, royalty-free, “no
license,” 77 or otherwise. This policy structure is relatively common among large
SDOs operating in the ICT sector.78
(6) Voluntary SDO Declarations: Some SDOs impose no formal licensing
commitments on participants, though participants may, at their option, disclose the
terms on which they are willing to license patents. 79 The SDO generally makes
statements it receives public through an SDO-maintained website. Despite the
seeming informality of such a system, voluntary disclosures such as these are far
from uncommon. The best-known SDO adopting this structure is the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), the primary developer of standards and protocols
73

AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS § 3.1.1(b), at 10 (2014) [hereinafter
ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS].
74
Based on a 2012 review conducted by ANSI staff, approximately 92% of ANSIaccredited SDOs (250 of 272 policies reviewed) either incorporated the ANSI patent policy
by reference into their own policies, or reprinted the ANSI policy as their own, with only
minimal deviations (e.g., substituting the name of the SDO for “ANSI”). Correspondence
with Patricia Griffin, ANSI General Counsel (Mar. 5, 2012) (on file with the Utah Law
Review).
75
BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 5, at 28.
76
See id. at 77.
77
In theory, even a disclosure that no licenses will be available can be helpful to the
SDO inasmuch as it may encourage SDO participants to “work around” the patents that will
not be available for licensing.
78
See BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 5, at 27 (stating that seven of ten SDOs
studied use this structure).
79
Such disclosures of intention are sometimes referred to as “Licensing Statements”
and are distinguished from more binding commitments to license. See ABA PATENT POLICY
MANUAL, supra note 5, at 72–81.
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for the Internet.80 With over seven thousand formal standards and policy documents
published, 81 including the fundamental protocols that enable Internet
communications, the importance of these standards and this SDO model to the
modern technology infrastructure cannot be understated. Yet IETF has neither
membership agreements nor any formal membership status at all.82
(7) Voluntary Non-SDO Declarations: These are statements made publicly by
firms engaged in the development of standards or the promulgation of common
technology platforms, but outside the traditional SDO-based standard-setting
process. Such statements may be made in a variety of settings and formats, including
public announcements, press releases, web site postings, speeches, and
correspondence with SDOs and regulatory agencies. 83 In addition to FRAND
commitments, these pledges also include clarifications of previously made
commitments, as well as commitments not to assert patents against certain
technology categories (e.g., open source software), not to seek injunctions under
certain patents, and not to transfer patents to nonpracticing entities.84
C. Process Obligations and Content Obligations
A FRAND commitment is, by definition, a promise to grant a license in the
future. These commitments fall into two general categories: commitments to grant
licenses on FRAND terms (“Process Obligations”), and commitments as to the
license terms that are ultimately granted (“Content Obligations”). Process
Obligations likely include a patent holder’s obligation to offer a license at a royalty
rate that is reasonable, to negotiate a license in good faith with the implementer, to
continue negotiations for some period of time, to refrain from seeking injunctive
relief to enjoin the implementer’s manufacture and sale of infringing products while
negotiations are ongoing, and to submit any disputes regarding FRAND terms to an
independent arbitrator before seeking such injunctive relief. Content Obligations, on
80

See Bradner, supra note 5, § 6.5 (“The inclusion of licensing information in IPR
disclosures is not mandatory but it is encouraged so that the working groups will have as
much information as they can during their deliberations.”). Despite the lack of any formal
FRAND requirement, between 2007 and 2010, IETF participants voluntarily made 378
FRAND licensing disclosures, representing 79% of all patent disclosures made during the
period. Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and
Analysis of an Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS 163, 182 (2013).
81
IETF standards and policies are published as “RFCs” on the IETF’s website. Request
for Comments (RFC), IETF, http://www.ietf.org/rfc.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6542AGDL (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). When originally used in 1968, the term “RFC” was an
acronym for “Request for Comments,” but that meaning has become obsolete over the years,
though the designation RFC has continued. See ANDREW L. RUSSELL, OPEN STANDARDS
AND THE DIGITAL AGE: HISTORY, IDEOLOGY, AND NETWORKS 184 (2014).
82
Admittedly, IETF appears to be unique in this regard, at least among major SDOs.
See BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 5, at 18.
83
See Contreras, supra note 9 (manuscript at 18).
84
See id. (manuscript at 5, 17–26).
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the other hand, pertain to the specific royalty rates and other “reasonable” license
terms to be included in such an agreement. 85 The distinction between Process
Obligations and Content Obligations becomes important, among other things, when
assessing remedies for breach of commitments, as discussed in Part IV.B.8 below.
D. Breach and Enforcement of Patent Pledges
Parts II.A through II.C above describe how and why patent pledges are made.
This Part discusses why it is important that patent pledges be legally enforceable,
both as against the original pledger and against subsequent owners of the relevant
patents.
1. Enforcing Pledges
Patent pledges are made, whether within or outside of SDOs, to assure the
market that the patent holder will take, or refrain from taking, certain actions
regarding its patents. In order to make these assurances meaningful, patent pledges
must be legally enforceable by at least some category of beneficiaries or “pledgees.”
To illustrate with a hypothetical, assume that patent holder “Paul” participates
in “3DPP,” an SDO that develops standards for 3D printing equipment. Paul and
twelve other companies cooperate within 3DPP to develop Standard I-123 defining
certain shape characteristics of the nozzle for 3D ink cartridges. The written policies
of 3DPP require that all participants commit to license any patents they control to
implementers of 3DPP standards on FRAND terms (a “Type 3” commitment, as
defined in Part II.B.1 above). Mary is a manufacturer of 3D ink cartridges and wishes
to sell cartridges that are compliant with Standard I-123. Mary, knowing about
Paul’s patent, can approach Paul to obtain a license either before or after she designs
and manufactures her cartridge.86 In either case, Paul has pledged to grant Mary a
license on FRAND terms. If, for some reason, Paul refuses to grant that license to
Mary, Mary may need to bring legal action to enforce Paul’s promise to grant the
license. Of course, Mary’s right to enforce may not be absolute, and various
extenuating circumstances could excuse Paul from granting a license to her (e.g.,
Mary did not accept Paul’s reasonable license offer, Mary has deliberately avoided
negotiating with Paul, or Mary does not fit within the category of third parties to
which Paul has committed to grant a license). But in all of these cases, parties and
courts require a sound, predictable, and generally applicable legal theory on which

85
Such terms could include requirements that the implementer grant the patent holder
“reciprocal” licenses, provisions ensuring that the license will be transferred if the underlying
patents are sold or assigned, and provisions allowing the patent holder to suspend the license
if the implementer sues it for infringement of its own patents (“defensive suspension”). See
ABA PATENT POLICY MANUAL, supra note 5, at 52–67 (describing many of these terms).
86
For a discussion of the considerations surrounding the timing of a potential licensee’s
request for a license from a patent holder, see Contreras, supra note 4, at 54–62.
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to evaluate and enforce claims for the enforcement of patent pledges. As discussed
below, none of the theories that are currently used adequately fill this need.
2. Enforcement and Transfer
Further complicating the enforcement of patent pledges is the fact that, in
today’s dynamic technology marketplace, patents are often treated as liquid assets
that are freely transferable from one owner to the next.87 What happens to a patent
pledge when the original pledgor transfers the underlying patent to a third party?
That is, do pledges travel with patents, binding their new owners, or are they binding
only on the original promisor? The question has serious ramifications given the
number of significant patent transfers that have occurred in recent years.88 Given the
importance of patent pledges to markets dependent on common technology
platforms and standards, it is important that such pledges remain binding and
enforceable even after the original pledgor transfers the relevant patents to a new
owner.
In 2008, the FTC brought an action against the purchaser of a standardsessential patent after the purchaser announced that it would not honor the original
owner’s commitment to license the patent to all implementers for a flat fee of
$1,000.89 The action was settled with the new owner agreeing to honor the original
owner’s pledge.90
In 2011, bankrupt Nortel Networks, a significant contributor to
telecommunications and computer networking standards, proposed the sale of
numerous assets, including approximately six thousand patents, on a “free and clear”
basis.91 Several product vendors, together with IEEE, raised concerns that Nortel’s

87

See U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE PATENT INFORMATICS TEAM, PATENT
THICKETS: AN OVERVIEW 17 (2011); Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us,
2012 STANFORD TECH. L. REV. 1, 1–2.
88
See, e.g., Top 10 Patent Sales of 2012, IDEABUYER (Feb. 20, 2013, 5:19 AM),
http://www.ideabuyer.com/news/top-10-patent-sales-of-2012/, archived at http://perma.cc/
VZ6N-3PUH (listing patent sales totaling $20 billion and encompassing thousands of
patents).
89
Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. C-4234, 2008 WL 4407246, at *1–5 (F.T.C.
Sept. 22, 2008); see infra notes 231–236 and accompanying text.
90
See id. at *6–9. It is interesting to note that the new owner, N-Data, did acknowledge
that the acquired patent was subject to a FRAND commitment and even committed to license
the patent on FRAND terms. The new owner simply declined to honor the original patent
holder’s specific promise regarding the FRAND terms to be offered—a flat license fee of
$1,000. Negotiated Data Solutions, 2008 WL 4407246, at *4–5.
91
Under Section 363(f) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in
possession may sell the bankruptcy estate’s assets “free and clear of any interest in such
property.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012); In re Nortel Networks Inc., No. 09-10138 (KG), 2011
WL 4831218, at *1 (Bankr. D. Del. July 11, 2011); see also In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 469
B.R. 478, 488 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (“On July 11, 2011, the Court entered an order
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“free and clear” sale could erase numerous licensing commitments previously made
by the company.92 Ultimately, the purchaser of the patents, a consortium including
several large product vendors, agreed to abide by Nortel’s prior licensing pledges.93
The effect of patent transfers on FRAND commitments also figured
prominently in the postcommitment statements issued by Microsoft, Apple, and
Google in February 2012, each of which committed to honor pledges made by prior
owners of the patents being acquired. 94 Finally, the standards-essential patents
asserted by the nonpracticing entity Innovatio IP Ventures LLC against a large
number of motels, cafés, and other retail establishments were acquired from
Broadcom Corp., an active participant in numerous SDOs.95 Which of Broadcom’s
obligations carried over to the purchaser of its patents?
Given the increasing number of patent sales and transfers in the current
marketplace, it is critical to develop a sound theory to assure the enforceability of
patent pledges when original pledgors transfer pledged patents to new owners. The
market reliance theory proposed in Part IV seeks to address this key issue.
III. CURRENT THEORIES APPLIED TO PATENT PLEDGES
Most commentators today would probably agree that patent pledges, or at least
some significant percentage of them, ought to be enforced.96 However, there is a
wide divergence of views regarding the most suitable theory to support such
enforcement. This Part reviews the primary enforcement theories that have been
advanced to date and assesses their strengths and weaknesses.

approving the sale of Nortel’s Residual Patent Assets, representing some 6,000 patents for
telecommunications, internet, wireless, and other technology, to Rockstar Bidco, LP.”).
92
See In re Nortel Networks, 2011 WL 4831218, at *2–3.
93
Id. at *7.
94
See Jorge L. Contreras, Guest Post: The February of FRAND, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 6,
2012), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/february-of-frand.html, archived at http://perma
.cc/J253-XRXJ.
95
In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 907 (N.D. Ill.
2013).
96
I am referring to actionable pledges only. See supra note 11.
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A. The Contractual Paradigm97
The patent pledges that have attracted the most attention in recent years have
been FRAND commitments, which courts, agencies and commentators have
increasingly described as “contractual.”98 This Part reviews the elements of common
law contract doctrine as it has been applied to FRAND commitments and concludes
that common law contract is a doctrinal framework ill-suited to address the diverse
and market-wide nature of such commitments, not to mention the even broader
category of patent pledges.99
1. The Case for Common Law Contract
As every first year law student learns, a contract under the common law is an
enforceable promise that meets certain requirements such as consideration, offer,
acceptance, and mutual assent.100 Not every promise results in a contract, and not
97
For the sake of expediency, this Article addresses the U.S. common law of contracts
to the exclusion of contract law of other jurisdictions. See supra note 12. I limit my scope
advisedly and with some trepidation, as the laws of non-U.S. jurisdictions undeniably play a
role in the global standardization landscape, and even in U.S. adjudications of standardsrelated disputes. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1066–71
(W.D. Wis. 2012) (purportedly applying French law to Apple’s contractual claims against
Motorola in connection with its participation in the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI)). According to a recent analysis by Professor Thomas F. Cotter, courts
outside the United States that have considered parties’ FRAND commitments have not found
contract theory to be a particularly strong theory of enforcement (especially with regard to
third-party beneficiary status). See Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of
Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311 (2014)
(discussing cases from Germany, the Netherlands, and the Republic of Korea).
98
See sources cited supra notes 14–16.
99
This is not the only context in which contract law, which took its current shape during
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, § 1.7, at 19, has
struggled to adapt to other modern modes of private interaction. Perhaps the most prominent
area in which this difficulty arises is in the law surrounding now-ubiquitous shrinkwrap and
clickwrap agreements. Most contract scholars readily acknowledge that the common law
conceits of offer, acceptance, and meeting of the minds seldom exist with such agreements,
yet are still at odds over the best (or any) theory to support the enforceability of these
agreements. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 627, 628 (2002) (analyzing the differences between analyzing contracts subjectively
and objectively); Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 464 (2006) (stating
that “the enforcement of browsewraps creates problems that need to be resolved”); Todd D.
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1175
(1983) (stating that “there is little agreement on what principles should control” contracts of
adhesion).
100
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) (“[T]he formation of a
contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange
and a consideration.”); Id. § 22(1) (“The manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange
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every promise is enforceable. 101 At first blush, the interpretive and normative
principles of contract law seem well suited to tackling the analysis of FRAND
commitments and other patent pledges. In most cases, such commitments are
embodied in a writing that is susceptible to the well-understood tools of contractual
interpretation. Moreover, the parties engaged in standard setting are typically
sophisticated commercial firms that enter into complex contractual arrangements on
a routine basis. The law of contract is thus a familiar and seemingly convenient
doctrine with which to address the difficult question of whether a party has lived up
to its commitments.
The contractual analysis, applied to the hypothetical proposed in Part II.B goes
something like this: Paul makes a FRAND commitment to the 3DPP SDO. This
commitment can be construed as a contract between Paul and 3DPP. The contract is
intended to benefit implementers of 3DPP’s standards. Thus, Mary, who wishes to
implement the standard in a 3D printer cartridge, should be treated as a contractual
third-party beneficiary of Paul’s commitment to 3DPP.
This analysis may, indeed, be valid for some commitments. But a closer
analysis reveals gaps and incompatibilities that make the general application of this
contractual approach difficult. This failure stems, at its root, from a fundamental
mismatch between the paradigmatic contractual transaction (a direct bargain
between two parties) and the more fluid and multilateral set of relationships that
characterize the standards-development environment. Figure 1 illustrates the
differences between the commitment structures under the contract paradigm and the
standards paradigm.

ordinarily takes the form of an offer or proposal by one party followed by an acceptance by
the other party or parties.”).
The Restatement (First) of Contracts defined a category of “unilateral” contracts that
included transactions such as sealed gift promises, option contracts, and bargains completed
on one side, such as loans made but not yet repaid. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS
§ 12 (1932). The First Restatement’s concept of unilateral contract was not the same as that
recognized by certain European jurisdictions. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
The Restatement (Second) has eliminated the category of unilateral contracts, as it was found
to be incoherent and of little value. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. f.
(1981). Special cases, such as option contracts and contracts that can be accepted by
performance, are retained, but without reference to the somewhat misleading label of
unilateral contract. Id. §§ 25, 45. Nevertheless, some commentators continue to refer to
unilateral contracts as a distinct category. See, e.g., Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reassessing
Unilateral Contracts: The Role of Offer, Acceptance, and Promise, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1, 4 (1992) (arguing that the “distinction remains significant”). I do not address unilateral
contract separately in this Article, because to the extent that the category is relevant to patent
pledges, its elements are encompassed by ordinary common law contracts or promissory
estoppel, which are discussed at length.
101
Gratuitous promises to make gifts, for example, are typically unenforceable. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) cmt. b, illus. 4–5 (1981).
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Figure 1
Contract v. Standards-Setting Paradigm for FRAND

2. How Contract Falls Short
As suggested above, contract doctrine fails in several fundamental regards to
address FRAND commitments, not to mention the broader spectrum of patent
pledges. As shown in Table 1, the structures for implementing FRAND
commitments are extremely diverse. Such structures vary from those that are almost
certainly contractual in nature (e.g., Type 1 Multilateral Agreements) to those that,
due to a lack of mutuality, definiteness or consideration, almost certainly are not
(e.g., Type 6 and 7 Voluntary Declarations). Thus, while a contractual analytical
framework may be suitable for a small number of patent pledges, it is unsuitable for
many others. Part III.A.2.a assesses the general applicability or inapplicability of
common law contract doctrine to the different types of patent pledges. Parts
III.A.2.b–c analyze the shortcomings of common law contract theory even in cases
in which contract law might, as a threshold matter, appear to offer a reasonable
framework for analyzing patent pledges.
(a) Contract Formation
(i) Commitments Embodied in Written Agreements (Types 1–2)
Under Type 1 commitment structures (Multilateral Agreements), each SDO
participant signs a multiparty agreement that contains a FRAND commitment. This
structure exhibits the formalities of contract formation and is most likely contractual
in nature. Unfortunately, due to the inherent complexity and inflexibility of
multilateral agreements and legal issues surrounding liability, intellectual property
ownership, and handling of funds, few SDOs are actually structured in this
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manner.102 With Type 2 structures (Membership Agreements), each SDO participant
executes an agreement with an independently incorporated SDO entity. A binding
contract is thus formed between the SDO and the participant patent holder. Other
members of the SDO, as well as nonmembers, are not parties to the contract, but can
seek to assert rights as third-party beneficiaries (discussed in Part III.A.2.b below).
But like multilateral agreements, formal membership agreements are relatively
uncommon among SDOs, particularly those with many memberships.103
(ii) Bylaws and SDO Policy Commitments (Type 3)
Many SDOs utilize Type 3 commitments, which are imposed through the
SDO’s bylaws and other policy documents, but without formal membership
agreements.104 The theory is, by joining an SDO, a participant accedes to the SDO’s
governing policies and thereby becomes bound by its prevailing FRAND
commitments. There is ample precedent (outside the standards-setting context)
supporting the theory that members of an organization are obliged to abide by its
governing documents.105 Yet these obligations do not arise through the application
of contract law, per se, but the law of business associations.106 The structure and
scope of such obligations is distinct from the law of contract. 107 Nevertheless,
102

See Biddle et al., supra note 53, at 191. Formal contractual structures are more
typical of patent pools, which are formed by a limited number of companies, each of which
has known patents covering aspects of a jointly developed standard. Id. In this and many
other respects, patent pools are different than voluntary consensus SDOs.
103
See Lemley, supra note 14, at 1910 (“But relatively few SSOs actually include IP
policies in a written contract with their members. Indeed, some SSOs don’t have membership
contracts at all.”).
104
Some SDOs attempt to impose contractual obligations on members through
membership applications that are not themselves contracts, but purport to bind the member
contractually to the SDO’s policies. See, e.g., VITA Membership Application, supra note 58
(“When accepted by VITA, this application represents a binding contract between the parties
and commits the applicant to . . . comply with all the terms and conditions of VITA’s Bylaws
. . . and such rules and policies as the Board of Directors may from time to time adopt
. . . .”).
105
Lemley, supra note 14, at 1911 (stating “the case law strongly suggests that merely
joining an SSO is sufficient to constitute consent to be governed by the SSO’s bylaws”).
106
See Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in
Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 1),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2572014 archived at
http://perma.cc/W4WT-NUVH (arguing that corporate charters and bylaws are
noncontractual in nature); Lemley, supra note 14, at 1910–11 (“[T]he case law strongly
suggests that merely joining an SSO is sufficient to constitute consent to be governed by the
SSO’s bylaws.”).
107
For example, the third-party beneficiary doctrine under contract law does not exist
in the law of business associations. The implications of this doctrine for FRAND
commitments are discussed later. See infra Part III.A.2.b.
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litigants, courts, and commentators have increasingly invoked contract law to
provide a framework for the enforcement of these FRAND commitments.
For example, the federal district court in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility,
108
Inc.
considered the FRAND commitment structures used by the European
Telecommunications Standard Institute (ETSI) and IEEE, two major SDOs. 109
Though these structures are different (ETSI using Type 3 (SDO Bylaws/Policy)
commitments and IEEE using Type 5 (Letters of Assurance) commitments),110 the
court analyzed them in roughly the same manner. It found that a contractual
relationship was established when the SDO “offered” Motorola, the patent holder,
the opportunity to participate in standards development, and Motorola “accepted”
this offer by agreeing to abide by the SDO’s policies.111
ETSI’s FRAND commitment is imposed by a section of ETSI’s Rules of
Procedure, to which participants must accede as a part of their general membership
obligation. Clause 6.1 of the ETSI Rules provides that
When an ESSENTIAL [patent] relating to a particular STANDARD or
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION is brought to the attention of ETSI, the
Director-General of ETSI shall immediately request the owner to give
within three months an irrevocable undertaking in writing that it is
prepared to grant irrevocable licences on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory (“FRAND”) terms and conditions . . . .112
The standardized ETSI form on which such irrevocable undertakings are made
requires the patent holder to state that it is “prepared to grant irrevocable licenses
under its/their [patents] on terms and conditions which are in accordance with Clause
6.1 of the ETSI IPR Policy.”113
ETSI’s policy thus requires that a patent holder make a written declaration that
it is “prepared” to grant licenses to implementers of ETSI standards on FRAND

108

886 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (W.D. Wis. 2012).
Id. at 1068–70.
110
The picture is further complicated by the fact that ETSI is based in France and its
governing documents purport to be governed by French law. See id. at 1081–85. The court,
however, appeared to rely on expert testimony to conclude that French law “requires the
same general elements” as Wisconsin law, and made little effort to apply French statutory
law to the case. Id. at 1083.
111
Id. at 1083–84. (“The intellectual property rights policies of ETSI and IEEE
constituted offers to Motorola for membership in the organization in exchange for
Motorola’s ability to participate in developing technical standards. . . . Motorola accepted
the offers and agreed to be bound by these policies when it joined ETSI and IEEE.”). Because
the policies of ETSI and IEEE differ in important respects, I will discuss the court’s analysis
of them separately.
112
ETSI IPR POLICY, supra note 59, at 35–36.
113
Id. at 44.
109
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terms.114 Even if a participant’s membership in ETSI creates a contractual obligation
to comply with ETSI policies, this obligation is not an obligation to grant licenses.
Rather, it is merely an obligation to make a statement that the participant is prepared
to grant such licenses. The difference is an important one, as it goes to the heart of
the patent holder’s alleged contractual obligation.
In fact, the ETSI policy contemplates that members may be unwilling to grant
licenses under their standards-essential patents, but does not characterize such
unwillingness as a breach of the policy. Instead, the policy establishes an elaborate
escalation procedure for addressing such unwillingness that includes consultation
with the unwilling member, attempting to design around its patents, relying on the
“good offices” of other ETSI members, and ultimately referring the matter to the
European Commission for resolution.115 And while the ETSI policy contemplates
other violations of its policy and establishes a procedure for dealing with them,116 a
member’s unwillingness to grant licenses on FRAND terms is not deemed to be one
of those violations.
Thus, despite the Apple court’s conclusion, it is questionable whether a
contractual commitment exists under the ETSI policy to grant licenses on FRAND
terms, as opposed to merely stating a less binding intention to do so. Recently, at
least one administrative law judge of the International Trade Commission (ITC)
came to the same conclusion, expressly ruling that the ETSI policy “is not a contract”
and merely “contains rules to guide the parties in their interactions with the
organization, other members, and third parties.”117
(iii) Follow ANSI Policy (Type 4)
As noted in Part II.B(4), the ANSI Essential Requirements provide that
American National Standards may include technologies covered by patents, so long
as the adopting SDO receives a written assurance from the patent holder that a
license will be made available either without consideration or “under reasonable
terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination.”118
This is ANSI’s FRAND commitment, so to speak. However, it is not a commitment
114

Though the ETSI policy is silent as to whom a patent holder must be prepared to
grant such licenses, it appears from the context that this obligation is intended to extend to
any entity that requests a license.
115
Id. at 38.
116
Id. at 41 (“Any violation of the POLICY by a MEMBER shall be deemed to be a
breach, by that MEMBER, of its obligations to ETSI. The ETSI General Assembly shall have
the authority to decide the action to be taken, if any, against the MEMBER in breach, in
accordance with the ETSI Statutes.”).
117
ITC InterDigital Initial Determination, supra note 16, at *75. See also TruePosition,
Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., 977 F. Supp. 2d 462, 470 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (finding that the
Working Procedures of the 3GPP standards group were “too indefinite to support the
formation of a contract”).
118
ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS, supra note 73, § 3.1.1(b)(ii), at 10.
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by an SDO participant, but by the SDO itself. Thus, under the ANSI policy, the SDO
may not include a patented technology in a standard unless the SDO has received a
written licensing assurance from the patent holder. The patent holder is not bound,
even superficially, by the ANSI policy. While in theory the patent holder may create
a binding contractual commitment to the SDO through the “written assurance”
required by the ANSI policy, neither the scope nor the legal nature of this written
assurance is specified, either in the ANSI policy or in most SDO policies.119 There
is thus a fundamental mismatch between the party purportedly obligated under the
ANSI policy (the SDO) and the party holding standards-essential patents.
Accordingly, it would be a stretch to attempt to use contract law to enforce a Type
4 commitment against a patent holder.
(iv) Letters of Assurance (Type 5)
Type 5 (Letters of Assurance or “LOA”) commitments are contained in written
documents or “assurances” delivered by a patent holder to an SDO. Under such
policies, the SDO does not generally mandate FRAND licensing independently of
such assurances. In this respect, Type 5 commitments differ from Type 3 (SDO
Bylaws/Policy) commitments, though they often appear similar. In SDOs with
bylaws-based commitments such as ETSI’s, the SDO requires that a patent holder
make a FRAND commitment contained in a letter. In SDOs with LOA-based
commitments, such as IEEE’s, the SDO merely requires that the patent holder
deliver a letter stating its licensing intentions, which may or may not contain a
FRAND commitment. The time at which an LOA must be delivered varies by SDO,
as does the wording of each SDO’s form of LOA.
IEEE requires that the patent holder submit an LOA in which it checks a box
describing its patent licensing “position.”120 That position may reveal that the patent
holder (a) will grant licenses without compensation, (b) will grant licenses on
FRAND terms, (c) will not enforce any patent covering the relevant standard against
an implementer, or (d) is “unwilling or unable to grant licenses”121 with respect to
such patents. The fact that a patent holder is free to select option (d) and decline to
make any commitment regarding the licensing of its patents indicates that the
granting of a license cannot form part of the membership bargain between the patent
holder and IEEE. Any promise inherent in this selection would likely be considered
made “in the alternative” and thus lacking in consideration. 122 Basing the
enforcement of such commitments on common law contract principles is thus
tenuous.

119

In this respect, Type 4 (Follow ANSI Policy) commitments differ markedly from
Type 5 (Letter of Assurance) commitments in which the SDO usually prescribes the form of
LOA.
120
IEEE LOA, supra note 64, § D.1.
121
Id.
122
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 cmt. b (1981) (discussing illusory
and alternative promises).

508

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

(v) Voluntary Declarations (Types 6–7)
Under Type 6 and 7 Voluntary Declarations, a patent holder may voluntarily
commit to offer FRAND or other licensing terms with respect to standards-essential
patents, or state its current intention to offer such terms. Typically, the patent holder
can unilaterally and voluntarily disclose this intention in any form it chooses, either
within or outside of an SDO. It would be difficult to classify such disclosures as
contractual obligations, as most elements of a formal contract (mutual assent,
consideration, and even a counterparty) are lacking. Even further removed from any
credible application of contract law are Type 7 statements that patent holders make
to the public at large outside any formal or informal SDO structure. These statements
could not, under even the most generous interpretation, be characterized as bilateral
common law contracts.
(b) Third-Party Beneficiaries
In the context of disputes over standards-essential patents, it is seldom the case
that SDO wishes to enforce the patent holder’s FRAND commitment. SDOs are
generally small, not-for-profit organizations that rarely have the resources or
inclination to engage in patent litigation. Moreover, SDOs typically seek to remain
neutral in disputes between their members. In practice, another firm—usually a
product manufacturer or vendor accused of infringing a pledged patent—typically
raises a patent holder’s breach of a FRAND commitment as an affirmative defense
to patent infringement.123 There appears to be no case in which a breach of contract
claim was brought against a patent holder absent the patent holder’s assertion124 of
a patent against the claimant. For all of these reasons, the SDO is unlikely to enforce
a FRAND commitment against a breaching patent holder. Instead, the party wishing
to enforce the FRAND commitment is usually a third party that wishes to implement
a standard using technology that infringes one or more patents. To do so under a
common law contract theory, the manufacturer must invoke the third-party
beneficiary doctrine.

123

See Lemley, supra note 14, at 1915.
Asserting a patent does not necessarily require the formal initiation of litigation.
Patent assertion can manifest itself through aggressive licensing tactics, demand letters, and
the like. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD
HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 26 (2013) (“In addition to lawsuits, patent assertion occurs
without firms ever filing lawsuits . . . .”). Thus, in Microsoft, Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,
Microsoft sued for breach of contract after Motorola threatened, but had not actually
initiated, suit against Microsoft for infringement of various standards-essential patents. See
No. C10–1823JLR, 2012 WL 395734, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 6, 2012).
124
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(i) Third-Party Beneficiary Doctrine
A nonparty’s right to enforce a contract is difficult to reconcile with the
common law contract doctrine requiring privity between contracting parties.125 But
beginning with the seminal 1859 New York case Lawrence v. Fox,126 and due in
large part to the advocacy of Professor Arthur Corbin in the early twentieth
century,127 third parties in the United States are now generally recognized as having
rights to enforce contracts made for their benefit.128 As described by the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts:
Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of
a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to
performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of
the parties and either (a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary [creditor
beneficiary]; or (b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to
give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance [donee
beneficiary].129

125

Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1364–
65 (1992) (noting that third parties, under the classical view, lack contractual privity with the
promisor and give no consideration for the promise, eliminating any contractual basis
supporting enforcement).
126
20 N.Y. 268 (1859). In the case, Holly loaned $300 to Fox so that Fox could repay
a debt to Lawrence. Id. at 269. When Fox failed to do so, the New York Court of Appeals
allowed Lawrence to sue under the contract between Holly and Fox, despite his lack of
contractual privity with either of them. Id. at 274–75. For a detailed account and
interpretation of the case, see Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of
the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1116–45 (1985).
127
See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 27 YALE L.J.
1008, 1020–22 (1918) (containing the first of six articles written by Corbin on the subject of
third-party beneficiary rights); Jean Fleming Powers, Expanded Liability and the Intent
Requirement in Third Party Beneficiary Contracts, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 67, 68 n.6 (describing
the historical controversy over third-party beneficiary rights).
128
In the United Kingdom, third parties still lack any common law right to enforce
contracts to which they are not parties, though this right may be conferred by contract. See
LAW COMMISSION, PRIVITY OF CONTRACT: CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTIES
6, 15 (1996), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc242_privity_of_con
tract_for_the_benefit_of_third_parties.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z7ZH-B5JG. This
right is, however, recognized under statute under English law today. Contracts (Rights of
Third Parties) Act, 1999, c. 31, § 1 (Eng., Wales, N. Ir.).
129
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1981) (emphasis added). The
formulation of the Restatement (Second) in this area has been criticized, among others, by
Professor Melvin Aron Eisenberg, who has called it “seriously flawed.” Eisenberg, supra
note 125, at 1382–83.
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Under the formulation of the Second Restatement, a third party’s capacity to
enforce a contract depends on whether that party is an intended beneficiary or an
incidental beneficiary of the contract.130 If the contracting parties did not intend that
a third party benefit, then the third party is merely an incidental beneficiary and
unable to enforce the contract. 131 If, on the other hand, the contracting parties
intended that a third party benefit from performance of the contract, then that third
party is an intended beneficiary and is entitled to enforce the contract.132
In most cases involving third-party beneficiaries, the intended beneficiary is
known to the contracting parties and is either a single person or a defined group of
persons (such as an individual’s heirs or legatees). 133 The failure to identify a
specific beneficiary, however, is not fatal.134 Thus, if B promises to pay anyone from
whom A purchases an automobile, and A purchases an automobile from C, then C
may bring an action against B as the intended beneficiary of the contract, even
though C’s identity was not known to A or B at the time the contract was made.135
In some cases, however, larger and less cohesive groups have sought to assert
contractual rights as third-party beneficiaries. These include members of the public
who have sued to enforce government contracts entered into for the “public
benefit.”136 For example, the residents of a neighborhood might seek to enforce a
contract between their municipal government and a public works contractor after the
contractor fails to extend a promised sewer line to their neighborhood. The theory is
that, because the municipality and the contractor entered into the contract for the
benefit of the neighborhood residents, they should have the right to enforce it as
third-party beneficiaries.
In the 1960s and 1970s, members of the public brought an increasing number
of third-party beneficiary actions to redress a variety of governmental obligations
otherwise lacking a private right of action.137 This tactic enjoyed some early success
130

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1981).
An incidental beneficiary “acquires by virtue of the promise no right against the
promisor or the promisee” to sue on the contract. Id. § 315 (emphasis added). For example,
“B contracts with A to erect an expensive building on A’s land. C’s adjoining land would be
enhanced in value by the performance of the contract. C is an incidental beneficiary” Id. §
302 cmt. e, illus. 16.
132
Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 622 (Md. 1985).
133
See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 55 (1978).
134
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 308 (1981) (“It is not essential to the
creation of a right in an intended beneficiary that he be identified when a contract containing
the promise is made.”).
135
Id. § 308 cmt. a, illus. 2.
136
See Eisenberg, supra note 125, at 1406.
137
Waters, supra note 126, at 1184–89 (discussing examples arising in the areas of
Medicare benefits, public housing, and public education); see also Karen Melcher, Note,
Contract Law—Absent Contractual Language Demonstrating an Undertaking Directly for
the Benefit of a Designated Class of Persons, a Person Cannot Establish Third-Party
Beneficiary Status, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 957, 957–65 (2000) (describing a third-party
beneficiary action against the government).
131
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but was eventually viewed as going beyond the permissible limits of the common
law third-party beneficiary doctrine. 138 The Second Restatement recognizes that
while government contracts may be intended to confer a public benefit,139 individual
members of the public should not be entitled to enforce government contracts or
recover damages for their breach, unless a specific remedy to that effect is expressed
in the contract or a private right of action for the breach already exists.140
The third-party beneficiary doctrine is currently recognized throughout the
United States,141 though application of the doctrine is not uniform,142 and not all
states adhere to the Second Restatement’s formulation.143 Unlike the Restatement,
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code does not expressly extend rights to thirdparty beneficiaries of contracts for the sale of goods, except in the narrow case of
enforcing express and implied warranties.144
Further eroding the third-party beneficiary doctrine, courts have held that
contracting parties can avoid the claims of putative third-party beneficiaries by
disclaiming application of the doctrine through standardized, boilerplate contract
138
See, e.g., Henry v. Phila. Adult Prob. & Parole Dep’t, No. 05-4809, 2007 WL
2670140, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2007) (noting that Pennsylvania “prohibits such an
expansive interpretation of third-party beneficiary rights”).
139
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313 cmt. a (1981).
140
Id. at § 313(2) (“In particular, a promisor who contracts with a government or
governmental agency to do an act for or render a service to the public is not subject to
contractual liability to a member of the public for consequential damages resulting from
performance or failure to perform unless (a) the terms of the promise provide for such
liability; or (b) the promisee is subject to liability to the member of the public for the damages
and a direct action against the promisor is consistent with the terms of the contract and with
the policy of the law authorizing the contract and prescribing remedies for its breach.”).
141
Id. ch. 14, intro. note.
142
See Patience A. Crowder, More than Merely Incidental: Third-Party Beneficiary
Rights in Urban Redevelopment Contracts, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 287, 301
(2010) (stating that decisions interpreting third-party beneficiary doctrine are inconsistent).
143
See, e.g., Jason Curry, Comment, No Appropriate Beneficiary Left Behind: How to
Refine Texas Third Party Beneficiary Law to Include All Appropriate Intended Beneficiaries,
40 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 183, 186 (2007) (noting that Texas law combines aspects of both the
First and Second Restatements in its law regarding third-party beneficiaries). Interestingly,
the third-party beneficiary doctrine is still not recognized in the United Kingdom, which
relies heavily on the privity requirement in contract. See VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, THE
PATHS TO PRIVITY: A HISTORY OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS AT ENGLISH LAW
165–67 (1992) (citing Tweddle v. Atkinson, (1861) 121 Eng. Rep. 762 (Q.B.) 764); see also
Waters, supra note 126, at 1152 n.159 (citing Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge &
Co., [1915] A.C. 847).
144
U.C.C. § 2-318 (2008) (identifying the narrow exception of “Third Party
Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied”); see also Gary L. Monserud, Blending the
Law of Sales with the Common Law of Third Party Beneficiaries, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 111, 205–
06 (2000) (arguing that U.C.C. remedies should, in some cases, be available to third-party
beneficiaries of sales contracts); Powers, supra note 127, at 114–25 (applying third-party
beneficiary analysis to sales of goods governed by the U.C.C.).

512

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

terms. 145 Thus, an opportunistic party that did not wish to give third-party
beneficiaries the benefit of its contract, even if such a benefit were contemplated,
could defeat such rights through the inclusion of a disclaimer in its contract.
(ii) Applying the Third-Party Beneficiary Doctrine to FRAND Commitments
In the case of FRAND commitments, a patent holder makes a promise to an
SDO that it will grant licenses to all who wish to implement a standard. Because
SDOs have proven reluctant to enforce such commitments directly against patent
holders, it has fallen to implementers to enforce the patent holders’ FRAND
commitments as third-party beneficiaries. At least two federal district courts have
adopted this theory,146 and some commentators have viewed the theory favorably.147
However, application of the third-party beneficiary doctrine to FRAND
commitments presents serious doctrinal challenges. To apply the doctrine, one must
first determine whether the contracting parties intended to confer on one or more
third parties the direct benefit of their contract. The strongest indicator of such intent
is an express statement in the contract itself. A few SDOs do include statements
favoring third-party beneficiaries in their membership agreements, bylaws, or
intellectual property policies. 148 Most, however, have not done so (yet). For the
majority of SDOs, the intent to confer third-party beneficiary status must thus be
inferred from other language.
But as discussed in Part III.A.2.b.i above, it is not enough that the parties to a
contract intend to benefit one or more third parties. In order to claim third-party
beneficiary status, the third party must be identified or discernible with sufficient
specificity. Depending on their construction, FRAND commitments can be made for

145

See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 398–99 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding that an express contractual clause captioned “No Third-Party Beneficiaries” clearly
indicated the parties’ intention not to permit third parties to enforce the contract between
them).
146
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1002–03 (W.D. Wash.
2012); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1085 (W.D. Wis. 2012);
see also ESS Tech., Inc. v. PC-Tel., Inc., No. C-99-20292 RMW, 1999 WL 33520483, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 1999) (declining to dismiss claim for breach of a FRAND commitment
brought by nonmember of SDO against patent holder).
147
See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 5, at 280–81 (“[A] FRAND commitment in which
the patent holder agrees to license on FRAND terms to anyone who intends to implement
the standard clearly creates a category of intended beneficiary for all potential adopters of
the standard.”). But see Lemley, supra note 14, at 1915 (expressing skepticism with respect
to third-party beneficiary theory in SDO context).
148
See, e.g., WIRELESS INNOVATION FORUM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY § 1.3
(2012), available at, http://www.wirelessinnovation.org/assets/documents/policy_on_
intellectual_property_rights.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5RLG-5PFN (“Each . . .
[implementer] shall be a third party beneficiary of all such obligations.”).
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the benefit only of members of the SDO,149 or members as well as nonmembers (i.e.,
all manufacturers of products implementing a standard).150
SDO members can make a stronger case for third-party beneficiary status than
nonmembers can.151 Because most SDOs are membership-based associations, it is
not hard to envision an SDO wishing to confer a benefit on all of its members
through a network of FRAND commitments, just as it does through other activities
such as meetings, professional networking, and publications. The question becomes
somewhat more complex when considering members who join the SDO after the
FRAND commitment is made (and perhaps did not even exist at that time) and
members who exit the SDO. Did the patent holder and SDO intend to extend thirdparty beneficiary rights to these entities at the time the commitment was made? As
discussed above, it is not necessary that beneficiaries be specifically identifiable at
the time a promise is made, but at some point, either in terms of number of
beneficiaries or time elapsed since the promise was made, the parties’ intention with
respect to beneficiaries becomes attenuated.
A more challenging case for third-party beneficiary status arises with respect
to nonmembers of the SDO. Many of the justifications that exist for an SDO to
confer benefits on its own members do not exist with respect to nonmembers. And
it can be argued that extending the benefits of FRAND licensing to nonmembers
reduces both nonmembers’ incentives to join the SDO and a competitive advantage
that SDO members might have over nonmembers. Moreover, nonmembers are not
themselves bound by the policies and agreements of the SDO and are thus not
required to grant licenses to SDO members. For all of these reasons, an SDO’s intent
to benefit nonmembers, absent an express indication of this intent, is questionable.
Nevertheless, many FRAND commitments require that patent holders grant
licenses to all implementers of a standard, whether or not they are members of the
SDO.152 The reason, of course, is that the marketplace, including the SDO and its
members, benefit from the broadest possible adoption of a standard. As the court in

149
The membership structure of some SDOs is complex and includes multiple levels
of membership having different rights, privileges, and obligations. See BEKKERS &
UPDEGROVE, supra note 5, at 28–29. What is more, some SDOs, notably IETF, have no
formal membership structure at all. However, for purposes of this discussion, I will assume
that SDOs have a single membership category.
150
See id. at 27 (indicating eight of ten SDOs studied had FRAND commitments that
applied to all implementers, rather than only members of the SDO).
151
Microsoft’s membership in IEEE and ITU appears to have been a factor leading the
court to treat Microsoft as a third-party beneficiary of Motorola’s commitments to those
organizations. Microsoft, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 999–1002; see also Henry E. Smith, Property
as Platform: Coordinating Standards for Technological Innovation, 9 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 1057, 1074 (2013) (“[C]ontractual solutions provide only partial or no protection to
parties outside the SSO who may adopt the standard.”); Lemley, supra note 14, at 1915
(discussing favorable arguments for SDO member treatment as third-party beneficiaries).
152
See BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 5, at 27.
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Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.153 explained, “[FRAND] commitments are clearly
designed to benefit potential licensees of Motorola’s standard essential patent[s] by
ensuring that such patents are readily accessible to everybody at reasonable rates.”154
But like members of the public who benefit from a government-funded public works
project, the SDO nonmembers who benefit from FRAND licenses may not be
entitled to enforce those commitments as third-party beneficiaries under the
common law of contract.
(c) Indefiniteness
The common law has traditionally treated contracts whose material terms are not
specified with sufficient certainty as lacking both mutual assent and evidence of the
parties’ intent to be bound.155 As such, indefinite contracts have generally been held
to be unenforceable.156 When parties reach a preliminary agreement but contemplate
further negotiation or the execution of a formal contract, this preliminary expression
of intent (an “agreement to agree”) typically does not create a binding contract
either.157
FRAND commitments are, by their very nature, indefinite. They specify only
that a license must be granted on terms that are “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory.” Key terms such as price, duration and scope are left open to future
negotiation. Of course, such omissions are not always fatal to contract enforceability,
and both the Uniform Commercial Code 158 and courts interpreting common law
153

864 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
Id. at 1033 (emphasis added).
155
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(3) (1981) (“The fact that one or more
terms of a proposed bargain are left open or uncertain may show that a manifestation of
intention is not intended to be understood as an offer or as an acceptance”); see also Joseph
Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1981) (“[B]efore the
power of law can be invoked to enforce a promise, it must be sufficiently certain and specific
so that what was promised can be ascertained. Otherwise, a court, in intervening, would be
imposing its own conception of what the parties should or might have undertaken . . . . Thus,
definiteness as to material matters is of the very essence in contract law”).
156
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(1); see also Joseph Martin, 417
N.E.2d at 543 (“[D]efiniteness as to material matters is of the very essence in contract law.
Impenetrable vagueness and uncertainty will not do”).
157
JOHN P. DAWSON, ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENTS 383 (9th ed. 2008).
New York law, for example, does not find an enforceable contract when parties leave
material terms for future negotiation. Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1010 (2d Cir. 1996).
158
U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2008) (“The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for
sale even though the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the
time for delivery if (a) nothing is said as to price; or (b) the price is left to be agreed by the
parties and they fail to agree; or (c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market
or other standard as set or recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or
recorded.”).
154
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contracts 159 have permitted parties to leave certain key terms open for future
determination. Nevertheless, FRAND and other commitments embodied in SDO
policies could suffer from too much indeterminacy to be found enforceable. Several
recent judicial decisions critical of the vagueness and indeterminacy of SDO policy
language underscore this point.160
3. Conclusions Regarding Contract
Common law contract doctrine fails in several respects as an effective structure
for the general enforcement of FRAND commitments and other patent pledges.
Except in the relatively rare case of formal membership agreements among SDO
participants, the application of common law contract doctrine to FRAND
commitments requires doctrinal gymnastics and thus represents a potentially
unpredictable and outcome-based distortion of traditional contract law principles.161
Table 2 summarizes the general applicability of contract doctrine to the seven
basic commitment types identified in Table 1.

159
See 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 4.3, at 575–76 (Joseph
M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993) (noting cases in which the following “agreement[s] as to price
[were] held too indefinite for enforcement: a promise to divide profits ‘upon a very liberal
basis’; to pay ‘good wages’ to a teacher; to pay [an amount] ‘not exceeding $300 [a] week’;
. . . to pay an amount ‘commensurate with the earnings of the company’ in addition to salary;
[and] to pay ‘a satisfactory amount’” (quoting Butler v. Kemmerer, 67 A. 332, 333 (Pa.
1907); Fairplay Sch. Tp. v. O’Neal, 26 N.E. 686, 686 (Ind. 1891); United Press v. N.Y. Press
Co., 58 N.E. 527, 527–28 (N.Y. 1900); Donovan v. Bull Mountain Trading Co., 198 P. 436,
439 (Mont. 1921); Mackintosh v. Kimball 101 A.D. 494, 497–98 (N.Y. 1905))).
160
See TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., 977 F. Supp. 2d 462, 470 (E.D. Pa.
2013) (finding that the Working Procedures of the 3GPP standards group were “too indefinite
to support the formation of a contract”); Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 318
F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 874 (2003) (finding a “staggering lack of
defining details” in the relevant SDO patent policy and thus exonerating conduct alleged to
violate the spirit of the policy).
161
See Lemley, supra note 14, at 1917, 1925 (noting that contract law has “loopholes”
and does not offer effective remedies for breach of SDO commitments); Cotter, supra note
97, at 350 (stating that, even if a court does apply contract law principles to a FRAND
commitment, “some of the more ambitious interpretations that have been proposed in the
literature may read too much into the nature of the FRAND commitment, simply as a matter
of contract law”).
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Table 2
Patent Pledge Variants and Contract Applicability
Commitment Type

Applicability of Contract Doctrine

Prevalence

1. Multilateral
Agreement

Commitment is contractual among
members; nonmember implementers
must rely on third-party beneficiary
(TPB) theory

Rare

2. Membership
Agreement

Commitment is contractual between
patent holder and SDO; member and
nonmember implementers must rely on
TPB theory

Uncommon

3. SDO Bylaws/Policy Commitment is either corporate or
contractual in nature; exists between
patent holder and SDO; member and
nonmember implementers must rely on
TPB theory

Uncommon

4. Follow ANSI Policy No affirmative commitment on patent
holder, merely a prescription for SDO
process; LOAs provided by members are
probably not contractual

Common

5. Letters of Assurance Obligation to provide LOA is a
(LOA)
contractual commitment to SDO;
FRAND commitment contained in LOA
is probably not contractual

Common

6. Voluntary SDO
Declarations

Voluntary licensing declarations are
almost certainly not contractual

7. Voluntary NonSDO Declarations

No contract

Rare
Uncommon but
increasing

It is worth asking why contract law, which is so well suited to the commercial
relationships that pervade modern economic life, 162 fails in terms of FRAND
commitments and other patent pledges. There are several possible explanations.
First, patent pledges, and FRAND commitments in particular, were not initially
conceived as bilateral agreements between parties. As discussed in Part II.A, these
162

It is a mainstay of legal practice that the law of contract governs the complex
network of commercial activity characterizing the global economy. Contracts, which
memorialize the obligations and expectations of sophisticated transacting parties, form the
basis for private interaction in such industries as finance, manufacturing, energy,
transportation, and entertainment. And while governmental regulation and doctrines arising
under antitrust, consumer protection, and unfair competition law have a significant impact
on private conduct in such industries, the primary mode of interaction among commercial
participants is largely through contract. Raymond T. Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass:
What Courts and UCITA Say About the Scope of Contract Law in the Information Age, 38
DUQ. L. REV. 255, 257 (2000).
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pledges have a public character and seek to offer assurances to the market at large
rather than to reflect bilateral negotiated terms between private parties. Second, there
is a wide diversity of structures through which FRAND commitments and other
patent pledges are made. While traditional contract doctrine is readily applicable to
some of these structures (Type 1 and 2 Policies), it becomes progressively less
applicable as the level of formality within the SDO decreases. Finally, contract
theory does not adequately account for the voluntary pledges issued by patent
holders, statements in which regulators and the market put significant weight upon,
but are not cognizable under traditional contract doctrine.
B. Promissory Estoppel
1. Pledges as Promises
A patent pledge is a promise. It may not be a promise that meets the strict
requirements for common law contract formation, but it is a promise nonetheless,
and under most circumstances, it should be enforced. For centuries, actions in equity
have existed alongside actions in law to enable courts to serve the ends of justice in
a flexible manner. 163 The doctrine of promissory estoppel prevents a party from
shirking a promise that should be enforced though it lacks consideration, mutual
assent, or other formal requirements of contract law.164 The Restatement (Second)
of Contracts summarizes the basic elements of promissory estoppel, as observed in
the United States today,165 as
[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise.166

163
See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 112–33 (3d ed.
1990) (discussing the historical evolution of the courts of law and equity); Henry E. Smith,
An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 1, 3 (Oct. 22, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/HSmith_LawVersusEquity7.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/W9BE-DKKS (noting that courts of equity existed as separate
courts until the early twentieth century).
164
3 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8.3, at 9 (Joseph M. Perillo ed.,
rev. ed. 1996) (“[A]n informal promise may be enforceable by reason of action in reliance
upon it, even though that action was not bargained for by the promisor and was not performed
as an agreed exchange for the promise. This is demonstrated by decisions of the commonlaw courts from the very beginnings of the action of assumpsit, by the decrees of courts of
equity making a very flexible use of the doctrine of ‘estoppel’ . . . .”).
165
All U.S. states and territories recognize promissory estoppel. Eric Mills Holmes,
Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263, 265, 270 (1996).
166
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981).
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Under the Restatement (Second) formulation, a finding of promissory estoppel
turns on the existence of a promise and the promisee’s subsequent detrimental
reliance. 167 In assessing reliance, “[t]he law may not question the adequacy of
consideration but it must (by definition) question the adequacy of reliance.”168 To
this end, the doctrine of promissory estoppel only requires promisors to honor
promises that others have actually and justifiably relied upon.169 The mere statement
“I shall pay you $1,000 tomorrow” creates no estoppel unless the promisee
reasonably relies on the promise, for example, by contracting to buy a new television
based on his expectation of receiving $1,000. If the promisee does nothing but wait
for the $1,000 to arrive, and incurs no other obligation and foregoes no other
opportunity in reliance on the promise, then no detrimental reliance has occurred
and no estoppel will be imposed. The only instances in which estoppel may be found
without proof of actual reliance are the narrow cases of charitable subscriptions and
marriage settlements.170 In all other cases, actual reliance must be established.
As discussed in Part II.A, one of the principal reasons that patent holders make
patent pledges is to assure the market that standards and other common technology
platforms will be available for broad adoption on reasonable terms, notwithstanding
the existence of patents. Implementers invest substantial sums in the development,
manufacturing, sale, and marketing of products incorporating standards, and are
encouraged to do so, at least in part, on the basis of such commitments.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel offers implementers a more attractive
vehicle than contract law to enforce FRAND commitments and other patent pledges
against those who make them. 171 Estoppel avoids many of the technical hurdles
167
BRIAN A. BLUM, CONTRACTS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS § 8.6.1, at 198 (3d
ed. 2004).
168
DANIEL J. BUSSEL & ARTHUR I. ROSETT, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 543
(8th ed. 2011).
169
FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, at 95. But see Yorio & Thel, supra note 47, at 162,
167 (arguing that the gravamen of promissory estoppel is rooted in the quality of the promise
made rather than reliance thereon).
170
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1981) (stating that “[a] charitable
subscription or a marriage settlement is binding . . . without proof that the promise induced
action or forbearance”). The traditional example of a marriage settlement is a father’s
promise to convey a parcel of land to his son in anticipation of his pending marriage. See
Phalen v. United States Trust Co., 78 N.E. 943, 943, 945 (N.Y. 1906); see also Johnston v.
Spicer, 13 N.E. 753, 753–54, 757 (N.Y. 1887) (stating that the man promised to convey
property to his soon-to-be wife in the event that he died without issue by the marriage).
171
See Lemley, supra note 14, at 1915–16 (giving a generally favorable view of claims
based in promissory estoppel to address violations of SDO policies). The FTC, however,
declined the opportunity to apply an estoppel theory in its action against Dell, which
allegedly breached a commitment to license patents relating to the VL-bus standard
developed at the Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA). See Dell Computer
Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 616–19, 633–34 (1996). Commissioner Azcuenaga, dissenting,
argued that if Dell’s certification, which stated that it did not hold patents covering the VLbus standard, was misleading, then Dell should be estopped from asserting its patents against
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imposed by common law contract doctrine and does not depend on the concept of
bilateral bargaining to be enforced. To enforce a FRAND commitment under an
estoppel theory, an implementer need only show the patent holder made a promise,
the patent holder intended it to be relied upon, and the implementer did, in fact,
justifiably and detrimentally rely on that promise.
2. The Challenge of Actual Reliance
The principal impediment to the application of promissory estoppel in the
context of patent pledges is the requirement of actual reliance. A manufacturer that
wishes to enforce a patent holder’s promise to grant a license must prove that it
actually and justifiably relied on that specific promise. But actual reliance in such
cases may be difficult to prove. Unlike buying a house or forbearing from collecting
a debt, the actions that a manufacturer would take in reliance on a patent holder’s
promise to grant a license (e.g., developing and releasing a new product) might
coincide with actions that the manufacturer might have taken anyway. Moreover, a
particular patent holder must tie actual reliance to a particular promise. For example,
using the hypothetical developed in Part II.B.1 above, patent holder Paul and ten
other firms hold patents essential to 3DPP’s I-123 standard. They have all made
FRAND commitments to 3DPP. Manufacturer Mary, knowing that the members of
the 3DPP group are subject to FRAND commitments, decides to release a new 3D
printer cartridge that complies with the I-123 standard. Now suppose that Paul
reneges on his commitment to grant a license to Mary on FRAND terms. How can
Mary show that she has relied specifically on Paul’s commitment?172 Must Mary
materially change her course of conduct by delaying the release of her product in
order to demonstrate reliance and to enforce Paul’s promise? Or must she show that
she was specifically aware of Paul’s patents that are essential to standard I-123? In
complex markets characterized by thousands of patents and dozens of patent holders,
demonstrating specific reliance is challenging.
Another difficulty in applying promissory estoppel to patent pledges arises with
the identity of the person to whom the promise is made: the promisee. Specifically,
only the promisee may seek to enforce a promise under a promissory estoppel
theory. In the case of FRAND commitments, the direct promisee is typically the
SDO. Although it has been postulated, the third-party beneficiary doctrine has not

other members of VESA who relied on that certification. Id. at 629–30 (Azcuenaga, Comm’r,
dissenting). The Commission, however, reasoned that “limiting the order solely to those
companies that relied on Dell’s certification might not fully protect the competitive process
or consumers” and adopted a broader remedy by prohibiting Dell from asserting its patents
against any implementer of the VL-bus standard. Id. at 625 n.5 (majority opinion).
172
For a discussion of why product manufacturers may (and often do) proceed with
commercial product releases prior to obtaining patent licenses from all holders of standardsessential patents, see Contreras, supra note 4, at 48–53.
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been widely recognized in the context of promissory estoppel. 173 Thus, if a
manufacturer is not the direct recipient of the patent holder’s promise (as is typically
the case), it may face further difficulty in enforcing that promise.174
Some SDOs, recognizing the value of promissory estoppel to potential
implementers of their standards, have attempted to create policy workarounds to
overcome obstacles to estoppel claims. For example, IEEE includes the following
text in its standard LOA form: “By signing this Letter of Assurance, you . . .
acknowledge that users and implementers of the [Proposed] IEEE Standard
identified . . . above are relying or will rely upon and may seek enforcement of the
terms of this LOA.”175
Such statements are intended to establish that the promisor (the patent holder)
is aware that others are likely to rely on its FRAND commitment—a useful showing
when making a case for detrimental reliance.176 Such statements may also support a
promisee’s argument that its reliance on the patent holder’s commitment was
reasonable and justifiable. But such statements do little to establish that the
implementer did, in fact, rely on the patent holder’s specific promise. Thus, despite
this well-intentioned policy language, the doctrine of promissory estoppel currently
remains an imperfect solution for the enforcement of FRAND commitments and
other patent pledges.
3. Efficient Placement of the Burden of Reliance
Unlike a common law contract, a promise enforced by estoppel does not reflect
a “meeting of the minds” by the parties. As such, one party is likely to be
disadvantaged, or at least placed in a situation that he or she did not wish to be
placed, by the enforcement of the promise. As Professor Avery Katz observes, such
a result is consistent with a view of promissory estoppel as a “regulatory”
mechanism, one that operates to achieve socially beneficial normative outcomes,
173

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. c (1981) (“If a promise is made
to one party for the benefit of another, it is often foreseeable that the beneficiary will rely on
the promise. Enforcement of the promise in such cases rests on the same basis and depends
on the same factors as in cases of reliance by the promisee.”).
174
Of course, the definition of “promisee” may be somewhat flexible. If a patent holder
makes a declaration to an SDO that it will license its patents on FRAND terms, it may be
possible to construe the other members of the SDO as recipients of that promise, in addition
to the SDO entity itself. As noted by one commentator, however, “[t]hird parties who did not
participate in the standards-setting activity and had no contact with the patentee would be
unable to establish detrimental reliance.” Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the
Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 659 (2002) (discussing patent
equitable estoppel rather than promissory estoppel). But see Lemley, supra note 14, at 1915
(arguing that both members and nonmembers of an SDO should be entitled to rely on a
promissory estoppel theory to enforce provisions of an SDO’s IP policy).
175
IEEE LOA, supra note 64, § G.
176
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (1981) (“The promisor is
affected only by reliance which he does or should foresee . . . .”).
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rather than merely to reflect the intentions of the affected parties.177 In the case of
promissory estoppel, Katz measures social benefit in terms of efficiency. 178 He
concludes that it is efficient to enforce a precontractual promise only if the promisor
would have greater bargaining power than the promisee after making the promise.179
The reasoning underlying this conclusion is straightforward. Economic
efficiency requires that the benefits of reliance and the risk that it will be
wasted be balanced against each other at the margin. The level of reliance
that is privately profitable for the parties will coincide with the socially
optimal level under two conditions: The person who controls the reliance
must enjoy its marginal benefits, and he or she must also pay the costs
when it is wasted. Since in preliminary negotiations both parties control
the reliance and the party with the ex post bargaining power gets the gains,
it is that party who should also bear the costs.180
Katz’s reasoning, which he developed from case law relating to precontractual
construction disputes, is extensible to patent pledges. When a pledge, particularly a
FRAND commitment in the standards context, is made, it is likely to induce the
promisee to incur substantial development, marketing, training, and other costs (i.e.,
lock-in).181 Thus, it is reasonable to enforce the pledge against the patent holder, as
the patent holder will likely have substantially greater bargaining power after the
potential licensee has made investments and become locked-in on the basis of that
promise.182
4. Promissory Versus Equitable Estoppel
Promissory estoppel should not be confused with the related but distinct
doctrine of equitable estoppel in patent cases. Both equitable estoppel and
promissory estoppel may be invoked when a patent holder represents in some way
that it will not enforce a patent against an infringer.183 However, while promissory
estoppel is based on a promise made by the patent holder, equitable estoppel
typically involves deceptive conduct of some other kind, such as a long period of

177

Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel
in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1253 (1996).
178
Id. at 1254 (stating that “reliance is reasonable when its expected benefits exceed its
expected costs—as in Learned Hand’s celebrated formula for determining negligence
liability in tort” (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947)).
179
Id. at 1257.
180
Id.
181
See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
182
Id.
183
See 6A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.05, at 19-542 (2014).
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silence implying the patent holder’s assent to a potentially infringing activity.184 As
explained by the Michigan Supreme Court, “Equitable estoppel is essentially a
doctrine of waiver. . . . Promissory estoppel, in contrast[,] . . . substitutes for
consideration in a case where there are no mutual promises . . . .”185
There is admittedly a place for equitable estoppel in policing private behavior
in the standards-setting context. Professor Henry E. Smith describes equitable
estoppel as a viable “anti-opportunism safety valve” for standard setting, noting that
it has the advantage of offering recourse to nonmembers of SDOs, as well as
members.186 The doctrine was successfully invoked as a defense in Broadcom Corp.
v. Qualcomm Inc.,187 a case in which the patent holder allegedly deceived an SDO
by withholding information in violation of SDO rules.188
Likewise, Professor Robert P. Merges and Jeffrey M. Kuhn, seeking to address
cases of deceptive conduct in standard setting, propose that standards implementers
accrue a reliance interest in their continued use of standardized technologies not
through promise (as this Article proposes), but through use. 189 Their doctrine of
“standards estoppel” provides that once a standardized technology becomes broadly
adopted in the market, implementers gain immunity from patent infringement,
whether SDO participants or nonparticipants hold patents, and whether or not they
have expressed any willingness to license these patents.190
While this proposed doctrine is appealing, at a practical level it would expand
the estoppel defense to patents held by third parties who are not part of the standardsdevelopment process. Such a proposal would enable opportunistic SDO participants
to draft standards to intentionally embody technologies claimed by nonparticipants’
patents. 191 Nonparticipants, not being part of the standards-development process,
would have no ability to negotiate with SDO participants to withdraw their patented
184

See, e.g., Radio Sys. Corp. v. Lalor, 709 F.3d 1124, 1126–32 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(holding that the patentee’s misleading silence for four and a half years following the initial
demand letter estopped the patentee from asserting its patent against alleged infringer).
185
Huhtala v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 N.W.2d 640, 647 (Mich. 1977).
186
Smith, supra note 151, at 1086.
187
501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007).
188
See id. at 303. Rambus also contemplated the possibility of equitable estoppel in
deciding on a course of action prior to its participation in various lawsuits with respect to its
involvement in the JEDEC SDO. See Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117, at *38,
44 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006), rev’d sub nom. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir.
2008). But see George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup
Problem in Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 939 (2011) (observing that both
“reliance” and “material prejudice” elements of equitable estoppel may be difficult to prove
in the standards context).
189
Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards,
97 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009).
190
Id.
191
This tactic of deliberately incorporating a third party’s patented technology into a
standard has been referred to as “guerilla standardization.” See Lerner & Tirole, supra note
4, at 24–26.
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technologies from the standard, and the simple use of this technology by a sufficient
number of implementers, against the will of the patent holder, could result in the
estoppel of any infringement claim. As such, the Merges-Kuhn proposal could allow
SDO participants to appropriate the patented technology of nonparticipants in a
standard without their acquiescence (or even knowledge) and would thus unduly tilt
the playing field in favor of standards implementers.
Suffice it to say that if market participants and courts are going to accept a
proposal for the general enforcement of patent pledges, the proposal must be fair
both to patent holders and standards implementers. But even if “standards estoppel”
as proposed by Merges and Kuhn were otherwise viable, both it and other forms of
equitable estoppel are based on deception, making them less useful in the many cases
in which patent pledges are sought to be enforced but deceptive conduct does not
occur.192 For this reason, equitable estoppel is not an ideal theoretical framework for
the general enforcement of patent pledges.
C. Antitrust
Antitrust law has also been proposed as a means for enforcing patent pledges.
Enforcement agencies in both the United States and European Union have recently
indicated a willingness to prosecute potential breaches of patent pledges using the
tools of antitrust and competition law. 193 Numerous commentators have also
advocated the use of antitrust remedies and enforcement as a means for policing
compliance with standards-related commitments.194 But, as discussed below, claims
under antitrust and competition law often require the demonstration of antitrust harm
and exclusionary conduct, which may not always be present when seeking to enforce
patent pledges.

192

Cf. infra Part III.C.1 (discussing limitations of deception-based antitrust theories).
Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, Google Inc., F.T.C. File No. 121-0120,
at 3 (F.T.C. Jan. 3, 2013) [hereinafter Google F.T.C. Statement], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/01/130103googlemotorolastmt
ofcomm.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9PFE-FQDC; Statement of the Federal Trade
Commission, Robert Bosch GmbH, F.T.C. File No. 121-0081, at 3 (F.T.C. Nov. 26, 2012)
[hereinafter Bosch F.T.C. Statement], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/cases/2012/11/121126boschcommissionstatement.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/S83K-TYY4.
194
See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 97, at 315–22 (discussing whether parties have a right
to seek enforcement of contractual obligations and whether the law of remedies can be
applied to patent rights); Cary et al., supra note 188, at 921 (“[I]t is unsurprising that antitrust
has long been applied to the conduct of standard-setting organizations. . . . Indeed, because
the opportunistic conduct resulting in patent holdup specifically ‘concerns the inefficient
acquisition of market power,’ many commentators have ‘generally assumed that [such]
opportunism in the standard-setting process is an antitrust problem.’” (citations omitted)).
193

524

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

1. Monopolization and Deception
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States.”195 To
prevail on a claim for monopolization or attempted monopolization, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant had power in the relevant market and willfully sought,
acquired, or maintained that power in an unlawful manner.196 The FTC may also
bring claims for monopolization and attempted monopolization under Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).197
The theory underlying monopolization claims in the context of patent pledges
holds that standards, once adopted broadly in the marketplace, can confer market
power on the holders of patents covering those standards.198 Abuse of such market
power could constitute unlawful monopolization or attempted monopolization.199
Accordingly, some have argued that claims of monopolization may serve as
effective means of ensuring that parties comply with their FRAND commitments.200
195

15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 407 (2004) (“It is settled law that this offense requires, in addition to the possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market, ‘the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power
. . . .’” (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966))).
197
15 U.S.C. § 45. The FTC may choose to bring an action for monopolization or
attempted monopolization under either or both of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act). The decision regarding which statutory
provision to proceed under is largely a tactical one, and may depend on whether the
Commission wishes to seek retrospective monetary damages available under the Sherman
Act or prospective (injunctive) relief under the FTC Act. See Dell Computer Corp., 121
F.T.C. 616, 626 (1996) (“[U]nlike other antitrust statutes, Section 5 provides only for
prospective relief. In fact, the judicious use of Section 5—culminating in carefully tailored
relief—is particularly appropriate in this type of case, in which the legal and economic
theories are somewhat novel.”); Google F.T.C. Statement, supra note 193, at 2–3 (“A standalone Section 5 unfair methods of competition claim allows the Commission to protect
consumers and the standard-setting process while minimizing the often burdensome
combination of class actions and treble damages associated with private antitrust
enforcement.”); see also Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, Federalism, Substantive
Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup, 5 J. COMPETITION L.
& ECON. 469, 495 (2009) (arguing that the FTC may have brought action under Section 5
rather than Section 2 due to the difficulty of meeting more stringent Section 2 liability
standards or a desire to achieve a broad reading of Section 5).
198
See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, HANDBOOK ON
ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF STANDARD SETTING 115–17 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter ABA
ANTITRUST HANDBOOK] (discussing cases in which federal courts have addressed “whether
a monopolist’s refusal to license intellectual property may provide a basis for a
monopolization claim”).
199
Id.
200
See, e.g., Hesse, supra note 28, at 19 (asking rhetorically, “Is it potentially a
violation of Section 2 when a F/RAND-encumbered SEP owner exercises the monopoly
196
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Most actions for monopolization in the standards context have involved claims
that the patent holder deceived either an SDO or other SDO participants regarding
its patents. As explained by the FTC, “Exclusionary conduct such as deception may
distort the selection of technologies and evade protections designed by [SDOs] to
constrain the exercise of monopoly power, with substantial and lasting harm to
competition.”201
This theory received at least some support from the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., which reasoned that a patent
holder’s intentionally false promise to license standards-essential patents on
FRAND terms could violate Section 2.202 Such deception, the court noted, “harms
the competitive process by obscuring the costs of including proprietary technology
in a standard and increasing the likelihood that patent rights will confer monopoly
power on the patent holder.”203 Despite the specter of such liability, however, the
court in Broadcom found that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring a claim for
monopolization (as it did not yet compete in the relevant market), and that it failed
to allege an antitrust injury.204 Thus, the court did not ultimately apply the Sherman
Act to the alleged misconduct.
The FTC has also brought monopolization claims based on deceptive conduct
within an SDO. These cases have included actions against Dell,205 Rambus,206 and
Unocal, 207 each of which involved charges that the patent holder deceptively
withheld information regarding patents essential to the practice of a standard and
later sought to collect royalties under those patents.208 In each case, this deception
was claimed to constitute exclusionary conduct giving rise to a claim for

power that he or she acquired through participation in the standard-setting process in breach
of the SEP owner’s F/RAND commitment?”); ABA ANTITRUST HANDBOOK, supra note 198,
at 87–93 (“Courts have long held that a firm may violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act by
using monopoly power in one market to monopolize or attempt to monopolize the market.”);
George S. Cary et al., Antitrust Implications of Abuse of Standard-Setting, 15 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 1241, 1244–54 (2008) (noting cases that address monopolization claims to ensure
FRAND commitments); Erica S. Mintzer & Logan M. Breed, How to Keep the Fox Out of
the Henhouse: Monopolization in the Context of Standards-Setting Organizations, INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L.J., Sept. 2007, at 1, 2–3 (discussing Rambus, the “first-of-its-kind ruling,”
in which the FTC unanimously held the unlawful monopolization warranted imposing
“liability on a single firm for subverting the standards-setting process”).
201
See Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117, at *18 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006), rev’d
sub nom. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
202
501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).
203
Id.
204
Id. at 303.
205
Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996).
206
Rambus, 2006 WL 2330117.
207
Union Oil Co. of Cal. (Unocal), 138 F.T.C. 1 (2004).
208
See Dell, 121 F.T.C. at 618, 624–25; Unocal, 138 F.T.C. at 2; Rambus, 2006 WL
2330117, at *2.
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monopolization. 209 The FTC settled its cases against Dell and Unocal, in both
instance entering a consent order effectively rendering the asserted patents
unenforceable.210 In Rambus, Inc.,211 however, the FTC found Rambus liable for
violation of Section 5, based on an underlying violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.212 In analyzing the element of deception constituting Rambus’s exclusionary
conduct, the FTC relied on its 1983 policy statement on deception, which requires a
“misrepresentation, omission, or other practice” that was likely to mislead others
acting reasonably under the circumstances. 213 The FTC concluded that Rambus
engaged in such deception, and when combined with the resulting harm to
competition, found Rambus liable for monopolization.214
While monopolization and attempted monopolization are powerful legal
claims, they do not seem well suited as general means for policing FRAND
commitments and other patent pledges. First, under the formulation stated by the
Third Circuit, a deception of some kind must be shown to make a claim of
monopolization.215 For example, to avoid triggering the FRAND commitment, the
patent holder must know that it holds patents subject to a FRAND commitment and
then conceal them from the SDO and its other participants. This conduct has been
termed patent “ambush,” and is generally viewed as deserving of sanction. 216
However, patent ambush does not appear to be common, or even the focus of most
litigation over FRAND commitments today. 217 Claims of monopolization seem
inapplicable to cases of genuine disagreement by parties over the scope of FRAND
209

See Dell, 121 F.T.C. at 629–32 (Azcuenaga, Comm’r, dissenting); Unocal, 138
F.T.C. at 92; Rambus, 2006 WL 2330117, at *2.
210
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Dell Computer Settles FTC Charges (Nov. 2,
1995), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1995/11/dell-computersettles-ftc-charges, archived at http://perma.cc/JFR4-83C2; Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Announced Action for August 2, 2005 (Aug. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2005/08/announced-action-august-2-2005,
archived at http://perma.cc/87EP-XGGS.
211
Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006), rev’d sub nom.
Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
212
Id. at *2.
213
FTC Policy Statement on Deception, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 14, 1983),
http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception, archived at
http://perma.cc/4LMY-W4AX.
214
Rambus, 2006 WL 2330117, at *2.
215
But see Hesse, supra note 28, at 21 (noting that some commentators have suggested
that a monopolization claim under Section 2 may not in fact require deception during the
standardization process).
216
See Gil Ohana et al., Disclosure and Negotiation of Licensing Terms Prior to
Adoption of Industry Standards: Preventing Another Patent Ambush?, 24 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 644, 648–50 (2003); Robert A. Skitol & Kenneth M. Vorrasi, Patent
Holdup in Standards Development: Life After Rambus v. F.T.C., ANTITRUST, Summer 2009,
at 26, 26 n.2.
217
See Contreras, supra note 4, app. (cataloging U.S. FRAND litigation through 2012).
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commitments and cases in which patents have been disclosed (i.e., not concealed),
yet the parties have otherwise failed to enter into a license agreement.
Second, as the D.C. Circuit held in Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 218 even when
deceptive conduct is present, it “must have an anticompetitive effect in order to form
the basis of a monopolization claim.”219 In overturning the FTC’s holding, the court
explained that deception “simply to obtain higher prices normally has no particular
tendency to exclude rivals and thus to diminish competition.”220 Accordingly, the
court held the Commission failed to establish that Rambus unlawfully monopolized
the relevant markets.221
Given the difficulty of establishing a claim for monopolization and the potential
lack of deception in many cases, it seems unlikely that an antitrust monopolization
theory will prove to be useful as a general legal theory for enforcing parties’ patent
pledges.222 This being said, in some cases a patent holder’s deceptive or otherwise
abusive conduct should continue to be actionable as monopolization or attempted
monopolization.
2. Exclusion and Essential Facilities
Another approach that has been suggested to enforce patent pledges under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act is to characterize a patent holder’s failure to grant (or
offer) an appropriate license, or its attempt to enjoin a manufacturer from using a
standardized technology, as a unilateral refusal to deal. Such refusals can give rise
to liability under Section 2 if they are intended to create or maintain a monopoly or

218

522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 464.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 467. The D.C. Circuit decision in Rambus has been controversial and the
subject of substantial debate. See, e.g., Richard Dagen, Rambus, Innovation Efficiency, and
Section 5 of the FTC Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1479, 1480–82, 1518 (2010) (discussing the D.C.
Circuit’s two fundamental errors in deciding Rambus); Joel M. Wallace, Rambus v. F.T.C.
in the Context of Standard-Setting Organizations, Antitrust, and the Patent Hold-Up
Problem, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 661, 661–62 (2009) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit’s
decision in Rambus is inconsistent with precedent); Richard Wolfram, Commentary,
“Analyze This!” Deconstructing Rambus Following the Supreme Court’s Denial of
Certiorari—The Mechanics of How the D.C. Circuit’s Decision ‘Jumped the Tracks,’ AM.
ANTITRUST INST. 5
(2009),
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/Rambus%20%20Analyze%20This%20-%20Deconstructing%20Rambus%20-%20AAI%20Comment
ary_042720092020.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/838T-EQGL (explaining that the D.C.
Circuit’s decision in Rambus was inconsistent and erroneous); Joshua D. Wright, Why the
Supreme Court Was Correct to Deny Certiorari in F.T.C. v. Rambus 1 (Geo. Mason Univ.
L. & Econ. Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-14), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1349969, archived at http://perma.cc/
5NZ3-D2R2.
222
See Skitol & Vorrasi, supra note 216, at 31.
219
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withhold access to an “essential facility.” 223 A limited number of cases have
considered whether the actions of an SDO can constitute exclusionary practices. In
Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Foundation, Inc.,224 the First Circuit held that an
SDO’s exclusion of a small security software vendor’s technology from the UNIX
operating system did not violate the Sherman Act, as adequate technological grounds
existed to prefer an alternative security technology.225
As Professor Tom Cotter observes, refusal to deal claims, both generally and
relating to essential facilities, have become increasingly difficult given courts’
generally expansive view of patent holders’ right to exploit their assets in the manner
they select. 226 Thus, in addition to demonstrating that a patent holder seeks to
exclude a competitor through its conduct, it must show that “the defendant intended
to engage in predatory—and not merely competitive—behavior.”227 In the context
of patent pledges, this is a high burden of proof. In fact, even in Broadcom, in which
the court found that Qualcomm had engaged in exclusionary conduct in violation of
Section 2, the court refrained from applying the refusal to deal doctrine. 228
Accordingly, monopolization claims based on refusals to deal in the context of
patent pledges, while possibly effective in a limited number of cases, are unlikely to
form a consistent and reliable basis for the enforcement of patent pledges.
223

See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 709 (3d ed. 2008); 2 JULIAN O. VON
KALINOWSKI, ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS & TRADE REGULATION § 25.04(3)(a) (2d ed. 2014).
Such claims are based on the principles set out by the Supreme Court in Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)
(holding that possession of monopoly power combined with anticompetitive conduct may
violate the Sherman Act); see also Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition
Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 532 (2013) (arguing that “anticompetitive exclusion, like
anticompetitive collusion, must be understood as a core concern of competition policy”).
224
152 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 1998).
225
Id. at 49. A similar claim was brought against several SDOs and SDO participants
in TruePosition Inc. v. LM Ericsson Telephone Co., 977 F. Supp. 2d 462 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
226
Cotter, supra note 97, at 332–34; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012) (“No patent
owner otherwise entitled to relief . . . shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or
illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having . . . refused to license or use any
rights to the patent . . . .”); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1981)
(providing that the patentee’s refusal to license technology “is expressly permitted by the
patent laws” because “[t]he heart of (the patentee’s) legal monopoly is the right to invoke
the State’s power to prevent others from utilizing his discovery without his consent” (quoting
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969)).
227
MiniFrame Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 11 Civ. 7419 (RJS), 2013 WL 1385704, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2013), aff’d, 551 F. App’x 1 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
223 (2014).
228
501 F.3d 297, 316–17 (3rd Cir. 2007); Herbert Hovenkamp, Patent Deception in
Standard Setting: The Case for Antitrust Policy 26 (July 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1138002, archived at
http://perma.cc/A647-TTKT (“The court also rejected the complaint of the defendant and
some amici that the complaint was of refusal to deal by another name . . . .”).
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3. Unfair Methods of Competition
In addition to the enforcement authority described above, the FTC has authority
under Section 5 of the FTC Act to prosecute “unfair methods of competition” and
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” 229 While monopolization and attempted
monopolization are actionable under Section 5, Section 5 also encompasses conduct
beyond monopolization.230 In the standards context, it is possible that breaches of a
patent holder’s FRAND commitments may themselves constitute unfair methods of
competition or unfair acts and practices actionable under Section 5, even without
deception.
In 2008, the FTC brought a Section 5 action against Negotiated Data Solutions
(N-Data) in connection with a patent reading on IEEE’s 802.3 Fast Ethernet
standard.231 In 1994, the patent’s original owner, National Semiconductor, pledged
to IEEE that it would license the patent for a flat fee of $1,000 to any party
implementing the standard. 232 National Semiconductor eventually transferred the
patents to Vertical Networks, which then transferred the patents to N-Data, which
allegedly indicated that it did not intend to honor National’s original $1,000
licensing offer.233 The FTC, in bringing an action under Section 5, argued that NData’s disavowal of National’s earlier patent pledge constituted an unfair method of
competition, as well as an unfair act or practice.234 The case was resolved through a
consent order in which N-Data agreed to honor National’s original patent pledge.235
Nevertheless, Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras, who dissented from the decision,
observed that, unlike Dell, Unocal, and Rambus, N-Data did not appear to have
engaged in deceptive conduct, and the Commission’s reliance on Section 5 may have
inappropriately expanded the reach of Section 5.236
The FTC renewed its use of Section 5 to address suspected violations of
FRAND commitments in 2012 and 2013, when it initiated investigations of both

229

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012); see supra note 197 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the
Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 930–
32, 934–37 (2010) (“Congress intended Section 5 to be a mechanism for upgrading the U.S.
system of competition law by permitting the FTC to reach behavior not necessarily
proscribed by the other U.S. competition statutes, including the 1890 Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act.”).
231
Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. C-4234, 2008 WL 4407246, at *1–5 (F.T.C.
Sept. 22, 2008).
232
See id. at *2.
233
See id. at *4–5.
234
See id. at *1.
235
See id. at *6, *9.
236
See Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. 051-0094, 2008 WL 258308, at *25–28
(F.T.C. Jan. 22, 2008) (Majoras, Chairman, dissenting).
230
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Robert Bosch GmbH 237 and Motorola Mobility/Google. 238 Both cases involved
allegations that patent holders improperly used FRAND-committed patents to seek
injunctive relief against potential vendors of standardized products.239 According to
the FTC’s complaint in Robert Bosch GmbH,240 SPX, a firm that Bosch sought to
acquire, had participated in an SDO developing standards for automotive cooling
systems.241 Despite having made a FRAND commitment to an SDO, SPX asserted
two patents covering the SDO’s standards against alleged infringers and then sought
injunctive relief to prevent future sales of infringing products.242 The FTC argued
237
See Bosch F.T.C. Statement, supra note 193, at 1–3. For a more in-depth analysis
of this case and its antitrust implications, see Cotter, supra note 97, at 327–29.
238
See Google F.T.C. Statement, supra note 193, at 1–5.
239
The propriety of seeking injunctive relief in the face of FRAND commitments
implicates other legal issues as well, including the application of the “public interest” test
under Section 337 of the International Trade Commission Act and the Supreme Court’s fourpart eBay test for injunctive relief. See, e.g., BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42705, AVAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENT
HOLDERS 9–20 (2012); U.S. DEPT. JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY
STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY
F/RAND COMMITMENTS (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
290994.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Y3CX-CM8Z; Colleen V. Chien & Mark A.
Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14, 20
(2012); Suzanne Michel, Bargaining for RAND Royalties in the Shadow of Patent Remedies
Law, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 889, 904–910 (2011); Colleen V. Chien et al., RAND Patents and
Exclusion Orders: Submission of 19 Economics and Law Professors to the International
Trade Commission (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 07-12, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=21
02865, archived at http://perma.cc/QPG4-73AE. This issue has prompted both congressional
hearings, see International Trade Commission and Patent Disputes: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2012); Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American
Innovation and Jobs, and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013), and
a presidential order, see Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: White House Task
Force on High-Tech Patent Issues, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 4, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-forcehigh-tech-patent-issues, archived at http://perma.cc/HBS2-ZZHB. Such conduct has also
prompted investigations by the European Commission Directorate General for Competition
under applicable provisions of EU competition law. Commission Decision (EC) No.
COMP/M.6381 of Feb. 13, 2012, art. 6(1)(b), 2012 O.J. (C 75) 1 [hereinafter EC
Google/Motorola Mobility Decision]; Press Release, European Comm’n, Samsung—
Enforcement of ETSI Standards Essential Patents (SEPs) (Dec. 21, 2012) [hereinafter EC
Samsung Press Release], available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-121021_en.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/4RML-PFHD.
240
Robert Bosch GmbH, 155 F.T.C. 713 (2013).
241
See id. at 715–19 (2013).
242
See id. at 718–19.
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that SPX’s attempt to obtain injunctive relief in the face of its FRAND commitment
was inherently coercive and oppressive, and thereby constituted an unfair method of
competition in violation of Section 5.243 In an attempt, perhaps, to defuse Chairman
Majoras’s criticism in Negotiated Data Solutions LLC244 regarding the expanding
scope of Section 5,245 the FTC offered the caveat that “[w]hile not every breach of a
FRAND licensing obligation will give rise to Section 5 concerns,” enforcement may
be required “when such a breach tends to undermine the standard-setting process
and risks harming American consumers . . . .”246
The FTC again took action to address a patent holder’s attempt to obtain
injunctive relief in the face of a prior FRAND commitment in Motorola Mobility
LLC and Google, Inc. 247 In that case, Motorola (later acquired by Google) held
patents essential to practice standards promulgated by IEEE, ITU, and ETSI. 248
Motorola participated in, and made FRAND commitments to, each of these SDOs.249
Nevertheless, in separate suits asserting these patents against Apple and Microsoft,
Motorola sought exclusion orders at the ITC and injunctions in federal court to
prevent future sales of standards-compliant products, even though both defendants
were allegedly willing to acquire licenses to Motorola’s patents.250 The FTC asserted
that Motorola’s attempt to enjoin sales of Apple and Microsoft products using its
standards-essential patents constituted an unfair method of competition in violation
of Section 5. 251 As in Bosch, the Commission’s decision finding a violation of

243
However, the FTC also acknowledged that SPX’s conduct likely did not violate
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 833 n.7.
244
Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. 051-0094, 2008 WL 258308 (F.T.C. Jan. 22,
2008).
245
Id. at *25–28.
246
Robert Bosch GmbH, 155 F.T.C. at 835. Despite this caveat, Commissioners
Maureen K. Ohlhausen and J. Thomas Rosch nevertheless dissented from the Commission’s
decision regarding injunctive relief. See id. at 835–36 (Ohlhausen, Comm’r, concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“Simply seeking injunctive relief on a patent subject to a fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory (‘FRAND’) license, without more, even if seeking such
relief could be construed as a breach of a licensing commitment, should not be deemed either
an unfair method of competition or an unfair act or practice under Section 5.” (citations
omitted)).
247
Motorola Mobility, LLC, No. 121-0120, 2013 WL 124100 (F.T.C. Jan. 3, 2013).
248
Id. at *2.
249
Id. at *4.
250
Id.
251
Google F.T.C. Statement, supra note 193, at 2–3. The FTC’s original complaint also
asserted that Motorola’s conduct constituted an unfair or deceptive act, see id. at *5, but this
allegation was dropped when the final order was adopted. Letter from Donald S. Clark,
Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Commenters 2 n.2 (July 23, 2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130724googlemotorolalette
r.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D7S9-6P8K.
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Section 5 in Motorola/Google was split 3 to 2. 252 The dispute was settled after
Google agreed not to seek injunctive relief with regard to standards-essential patents
unless and until it complied with a series of procedural steps intended to facilitate
agreement with prospective licensees regarding FRAND terms and conditions.253
Despite the FTC’s invocation of Section 5 to condemn nondeceptive breaches
of FRAND commitments in N-Data, Bosch, and Motorola/Google, it is not clear
that Section 5 offers an optimal general theory for enforcing patent pledges. First,
the boundaries of Section 5 in actions that do not involve monopolization and
deception are relatively unclear, and there is still significant disagreement both
among commentators 254 and FTC commissioners themselves 255 regarding the
appropriate extent of Section 5 liability. Relying on such an uncertain and judicially
untested standard as the principal mechanism for enforcing patent pledges could
make the enforcement of such pledges less predictable and thus diminish their value
as market-wide assurances. 256 Second, even if the parameters of Section 5 were
clarified to cover breaches of patent pledges with greater reliability, an action under
252
Commissioner Ohlhausen dissented with respect to both the unfair methods of
competition and unfair acts and practices analyses. Motorola Mobility, 2013 WL 124100, at
*26–27 (Ohlhausen, Comm’r, dissenting). Commissioner Rosch disagreed with the majority
on the unfair methods of competition analysis. Id. at *29–31 (Rosch, Comm’r, dissenting).
Professor Cotter offers a cogent analysis of the likely disposition of the commission
following a series of personnel changes in mid-2013. See Cotter, supra note 97, at 331–32.
253
Id. at *11–15 (majority opinion).
254
In favor of a broad use of antitrust enforcement to address FRAND breaches, see,
for example, Cary et al., supra note 188, at 943 (“[I]t is fair to ask why antitrust law should
not reach opportunism, whether it was the patent holder’s intent all along or whether it
occurred to the patent holder only after the standard was adopted.”); Farrell et al., supra note
35, at 605–06 (arguing that “similar economic logic underlies some cases where patents were
disclosed but users assert that the patent holder is not meeting its duty to license in a
reasonable fashion” in the context of alleged violations of FRAND commitments). And for
a skeptical look at the broad use of antitrust to address such claims, see, for example, Cotter,
supra note 97, at 332 (“[T]he role of U.S. antitrust law as a means for enforcing FRAND
commitments seems quite limited.”); Dagen, supra note 221, at 1503 (“Many believe that
the interpretation of Section 5 as broader than the Sherman Act is a remnant of a bygone
era.”); Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 197, at 495 (calling a broad expansion of Section 5
liability “unsound antitrust policy”).
255
See supra note 193; see also Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Proposed Policy Statement Regarding Unfair Methods of Competition Under Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act 2–5 (June 19, 2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2013/06/statement-commissioner-joshua-d-wright,
archived at http://perma.cc/4CSW-X8AL (supporting a relatively narrow interpretation of
“unfair methods of competition”).
256
One need only recall the D.C. Circuit’s reversal of the FTC’s decision in Rambus
for a stark reminder that, while U.S. enforcement agencies may have theories regarding the
scope and applicability of the law, such agencies do not make the law, and their actions are
ultimately subject to review by the courts. See Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 468–69
(D.C. Cir. 2008).
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Section 5 can be brought by only the FTC in its enforcement capacity, and not by
private litigants. Thus, such actions depend on the enforcement priorities and
resources of the FTC and as such cannot provide a reliable means for enforcing
patent pledges across the board.
4. Antitrust Approaches, Generally
Beyond the technical considerations discussed above, several commentators
have raised policy-oriented concerns regarding the use of antitrust theories, in
general, to enforce FRAND commitments and other patent pledges. To a significant
degree, this debate mirrors the larger debate within the antitrust community
regarding the advisability of weak versus strong antitrust enforcement in the area of
intellectual property. 257 Professor David J. Teece and Edward F. Sherry, for
example, argue that greater (and presumably unpredictable) intervention by antitrust
enforcement authorities could erode patent holder confidence and willingness to
participate in standards-development activities.258 The net result of such decreases
in participation they argue would be an overall decline in innovation. George S. Cary
and coauthors have criticized this position, finding little evidence supporting the
specter of declining SDO participation resulting from greater antitrust
enforcement.259
More importantly, Professors Bruce H. Kobayashi and Joshua D. Wright260
have argued that antitrust remedies should be avoided when private legal remedies

257

See, e.g., Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation
and Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 931 (2010) (“Antitrust law should stand aside when a
government agency is an active regulator, but not when economic decision making is left
entirely in private hands. As a result, antitrust rightfully has a place when the anticompetitive
conduct occurs subsequent to patent issuance.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and
Innovation: Where We Are and Where We Should Be Going, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 749, 750
(2011) (“[W]here intellectual property law leaves questions open, antitrust policy should feel
free to seek the most competitive outcomes as long as they do not frustrate the underlying
regulatory regime.”); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, The Limits of Antitrust and
Patent Holdup: A Reply to Cary et al., 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 505, 506 n.4 (2012) (providing
additional relevant sources into the relationship between intellectual property law and
antitrust law).
258
David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 1913, 1986 (2003).
259
Cary et al., supra note 188, at 923–24. I too am skeptical of predictions that
participation in SDOs will decline because of greater constraints on potentially opportunistic
behavior. Cf. Contreras, supra note 80, at 204–10 (finding little evidence of adverse effects
on SDOs implementing requirements for greater disclosure of patent royalty rates).
260
Wright was subsequently appointed as a commissioner of the FTC. Commissioners,
FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/commissioners, archived at
http://perma.cc/T7XY-8TQ5 (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
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(such as contract and tort law) are available to redress the relevant harms.261 They
reason first that antitrust law offers “little marginal benefit” over other legal regimes,
and that the application of antitrust law to alleged instances of patent hold-up will
thus yield inappropriate “false positives” (i.e., condemnation of behavior that does
not otherwise give rise to liability).262 They further argue that the Supreme Court in
a number of related areas has discouraged the use of antitrust law when such
conditions are met.263 Cary and coauthors have critiqued Professors Kobayashi and
Wright’s position, both with respect to their analysis of Supreme Court precedent264
as well as their contention that antitrust offers little benefit beyond existing legal
remedies.265 To this last point, Cary argues, consistently with Parts III.A and III.B
of this Article, that doctrines such as contract, estoppel, and tort are probably
available only to parties having a direct relationship with the patent holder or SDO,
and offer little recourse to third-party consumers who may be harmed by a patent
holder’s failure to abide by its commitments.266 While Cary looks to antitrust law to
fill the gap left by these other legal doctrines, the market reliance theory proposed
in this Article offers a viable alternative without implicating the enforcement
concerns raised by Professors Kobayashi and Wright.267
D. Patent Misuse
Some commentators, notably Professor Daryl Lim, have suggested that
violations of FRAND commitments and other misconduct in the standard-setting

261

See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 197, at 506–16 (discussing the comparative
advantage of tort and contract law in regulating breach of FRAND commitments).
262
Id. at 486.
263
See id. at 472–86 (going so far as to refer to these cases as resulting in the implied
preemption of antitrust law by state liability doctrines in such cases).
264
See Cary et al., supra note 188, at 925–37. But see Kobayashi & Wright, supra note
257, at 508–21 (responding to criticisms).
265
See Cary et al., supra note 188, at 937–44; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Patent
Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1197 (2009)
(criticizing Kobayashi and Wright’s “false positive” analysis). But see Kobayashi & Wright,
supra note 257, at 521–26 (responding to criticisms).
266
See Cary et al., supra note 188, at 937–44.
267
While Professors Kobayashi and Wright speak to the virtues of contract law as a
mechanism for enforcing patent-related commitments and addressing patent holdup,
Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 257, at 523–26, their position does not speak exclusively
to common law contract doctrine as I have outlined it in Part III.A above. And while
Professors Kobayashi and Wright describe various benefits afforded by “contract” doctrine,
their analysis appears to encompass both common law contract and promissory estoppel
under this general contract rubric. See id. at 524–26. Accordingly, I believe that the
Kobayashi and Wright analysis would equally favor the application of the market reliance
doctrine proposed in this Article.
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context should be addressed under a patent misuse theory.268 Patent misuse is an
equitable defense to a claim for patent infringement that excuses infringement upon
a showing that the patent holder sought to exceed the scope of the patent grant.269
Patent misuse doctrine finds roots in both antitrust and patent law270 and has been
used to address conduct including the tying of a patent license to the purchase of
unpatented articles, 271 the collection of royalties following the expiration of a
patent’s term,272 and the collection of royalties on sales of unpatented articles.273 The
consequences of a finding of misuse are severe and often result in a patent becoming
unenforceable until the effects of the misuse have been sufficiently dissipated or
“purged.”274
Despite the potential of the patent misuse defense, its application to the
enforcement of most patent pledges is not promising. Under current judicial
interpretations, a finding of patent misuse requires that the patent holder attempted
to exceed the bounds of the patent grant. Charging a royalty to license a valid,
unexpired patent, even an unreasonably high one, is squarely within a patent holder’s
statutory rights. In fact, the U.S. Patent Act goes even further and expressly provides
that a patent holder’s complete refusal to license a patent will not constitute an act
of patent misuse.275 Thus, it is difficult to see how a patent holder could be found to
268

See Daryl Lim, Misconduct in Standard Setting: The Case for Patent Misuse, 51
IDEA 559, 559–60 (2011); Daryl Lim, Standard Essential Patents, Trolls and the
Smartphone Wars: Triangulating the End Game, 119 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 86–90 (2014)
[hereinafter Lim, Standard Essential Patents].
269
See Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945) (stating that “any
attempted reservation or continuation in the patentee or those claiming under him of the
patent monopoly, after the patent expires, whatever the legal device employed, runs counter
to the policy and purpose of the patent laws”); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33–34
(1964) (“The exaction of royalties for use of a machine after the patent has expired is an
assertion of monopoly power in the post-expiration period when, as we have seen, the patent
has entered the public domain. . . . [A]n attempt to project it into another term by continuation
of the licensing agreement is unenforceable.” (citations omitted)).
270
See Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 476
(2011) (referring to the patent misuse doctrine as “a schizophrenic doctrine that vacillates
between IP and antitrust law”).
271
See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 489–91 (1942).
272
See Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 33–34. But see Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440
U.S. 257, 265–66 (1979) (holding that an unsuccessful applicant for a patent may charge
royalties indefinitely if a patent never issues); Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014,
1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (permitting postexpiration royalties as reflective of an economic bargain
between parties).
273
See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969)
(holding that conditioning the license of one patent on the licensing of another and payment
of royalties on unpatented articles constitute misuse).
274
U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957).
275
35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2012) (“No patent owner . . . shall be . . . deemed guilty of
misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having . . . refused to license
. . . any rights to the patent . . . .”).
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commit patent misuse by charging a royalty that exceeds a promised “reasonable”
rate, or enforcing a patent that it promised not to enforce.
Lim argues that the doctrine of patent misuse should be expanded to provide a
more general equitable tool for policing unfair and inequitable conduct using
patents. 276 Such a judicial expansion of the misuse doctrine may be warranted,
though the breadth and potential subjectivity of such a doctrine would need to be
taken carefully into account. But in any event, until such an expansion of the patent
misuse doctrine occurs, it does not present itself as a likely candidate for the general
enforcement of patent pledges.
E. Equitable Servitude
Building on the work of Professors Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith,277
Professor Jay P. Kesan and Carol Hayes liken FRAND commitments to
encumbrances on real property (i.e., equitable servitudes “running with the land”).278
Professor Kesan and Hayes argue that FRAND commitments should be treated as
servitudes appurtenant to the patents they encumber, and that such commitments
should, in effect, “run with the patent.”279 They identify several areas in which this
property-based characterization would yield benefits: FRAND commitments would
more readily bind subsequent owners of pledged patents, FRAND commitments
would be harder to avoid and negate in bankruptcy proceedings, and specific
performance might be more readily available to enforce such commitments.280
A property-based theory for enforcing patent pledges is attractive, as it could
bind the affected patents themselves, in an in rem manner, rather than patent holders,
which may be transient and subject to change. Professor Smith himself
acknowledges the benefits of property-based theories when dealing with standards
setting, though in a somewhat different context. 281 While a property-based
characterization of FRAND commitments has benefits, it is not clear that such an
approach is viable on a theoretical or practical level. At a theoretical level, Professor
Kesan and Hayes acknowledge 282 one of the primary difficulties in analogizing
patent-related encumbrances to real property servitudes: patents are not real
property; they are, at most, treated in some respects as personal property,283 and
276

Lim, Standard Essential Patents, supra note 268, at 89 (“The need to do justice
allows courts to look beyond the form of a misuse to its effects.”).
277
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 776–811 (2001).
278
See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 5, at 285–86.
279
Id. at 297–300.
280
Id. at 296–300.
281
Smith, supra note 163, at 16–17 (discussing property-like aspects of the
standardization function itself, as implemented through the SDO).
282
Kesan & Hayes, supra note 5, at 286–87.
283
35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (deeming patents to “have the attributes of personal
property”).
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servitudes on personal property are generally disfavored in the law.284 In arguing
against this presumption, Professor Kesan and Hayes cite commentators who have
recently urged an application of property-based rules to copyright licenses. 285
However, FRAND commitments are not, themselves, intellectual property licenses,
but merely promises to grant licenses, thus running into one of the same obstacles
that impede common law contract theory in this area. 286 Moreover, Professor
Christina M. Mulligan has argued that servitudes grounded in real property law
should not be extended to personal property, in general, or intellectual property
licenses, in particular, due to increased information costs associated with identifying
and handling servitudes applicable to numerous, frequently transferred forms of
property.287
At a practical level, the equitable servitude approach might prove useful in
describing FRAND commitments that are clearly delineated and attached to one or
more identified patents, like easements recorded in the deeds of parcels of realty.
But as illustrated by Table 1, most FRAND commitments are not so well specified.
And a real property analogy is less likely to hold as to FRAND commitments that
are made with respect to a patent holder’s portfolio in general, without reference to
particular patents, or by means of implied commitments to abide by an SDO’s
bylaws.288 Thus, the equitable servitude theory, even if theoretically viable, might
284

See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 18 & n.68 (2000) (“American
precedent is largely, if not quite exclusively, in accord” with the principle that “one cannot
create servitudes in personal property”); Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1455 (2004). In fact, there is a large body of cases involving
covenants relating to real property that have been deemed by the courts to be contractual in
nature, rather than encumbrances affecting title to the property. See, e.g., Mountain Brow
Lodge No. 82 v. Toscano, 64 Cal. Rptr. 816, 818–19 (Ct. App. 1967) (holding a covenant
not to sell a property for use other than as a fraternal lodge acted as a condition subsequent
rather than a restraint on alienation).
285
See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 5, at 285–88 (citing Christopher M. Newman, A
License Is Not a “Contract Not To Sue”: Disentangling Property and Contract in the Law
of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1101 (2013); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The
New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008)).
286
See supra Part III.A.
287
Christina M. Mulligan, The Cost of Personal Property Servitudes: Lessons for the
Internet of Things 1 (July 14, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2465651, archived at http://perma.cc/R
6PM-VDEA (theorizing that “greater flexibility in property interests is most beneficial when
property is distinct, valuable, and rarely encountered” and arguing that “[i]n comparison,
greater standardization is appropriate when property is fungible, lacks value, and is casually
or frequently interacted with”).
288
An analogy in the real property context might be a public announcement by the
owner of a hotel chain that “room rates at our properties will always be fair and reasonable.”
While consumers who allege that such rates are unreasonably high during the summer travel
season may have actions in contract, promissory estoppel, and various consumer protection
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only have limited applicability to a subset of FRAND commitments and even less
to the broader realm of patent pledges.
IV. MARKET RELIANCE
Part III identified deficiencies in current contract, promissory estoppel,
antitrust, and other theories used to justify the enforcement of FRAND
commitments. Part IV offers a new “market reliance” theory that looks to securities
regulation and the doctrine of fraud-on-the-market to adapt the doctrine of
promissory estoppel for the enforcement of FRAND commitments and other patent
pledges.
A. Public Securities Law and “Fraud-on-the-Market”
Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934,289 prohibits the making of untrue statements or omissions of material fact
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.290 Private litigants may invoke
Rule 10b-5 when bringing claims against issuers of public securities, generally,
when they incur trading losses resulting from such untrue statements or omissions
(i.e., selling at an artificially low price or buying at an artificially high price). The
basic elements of a private Rule 10b-5 claim stem from the common law actions for
fraud and deceit.291 To prevail on a common law fraud claim, the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant made a false statement or omission of material fact with
the intent to induce the plaintiff’s action, and that the plaintiff justifiably relied on
the statement to his or her detriment.292 Thus, like a claim for promissory estoppel,
a claim for fraud requires reliance by the injured party.
But unlike a traditional claim for fraud or for promissory estoppel, the injured
party’s reliance in a Rule 10b-5 action may be presumed under a doctrine that has
come to be known as fraud-on-the-market. Fraud-on-the-market is based on the
efficient capital markets hypothesis, which posits that in an efficient securities
market all available information, true or false, will be reflected rapidly in the price
of a company’s stock. Thus, as soon as the company or one of its officers makes a
false statement, the company’s stock price will either rise or fall based on the false
information, and the plaintiff, so long as he or she purchased stock in the open
market, need not demonstrate specific reliance on the statement in order to make a
claim.
laws, it is hard to envision a scenario in which the properties themselves can be said to be
burdened by an equitable servitude.
289
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
290
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014).
291
See 7 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 426–55 (4th ed. 2012); 4
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.10[6][B] (6th
ed. 2009).
292
See LOSS ET AL., supra note 291, at 427.
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The fraud-on-the-market theory is generally attributed to Professor Daniel R.
Fischel at the University of Chicago, who promoted it as a means for securities
plaintiffs to overcome the requirement that they demonstrate actual reliance on
particular statements made by or about a company. 293 Professor Fischel’s work
began to be cited by federal district and circuit courts by the early 1980s,294 and in
1988 the Supreme Court adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory in Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson,295 a little over a decade after the theory’s emergence.
In 1976, Basic Inc., a publicly traded chemical manufacturer, began merger
discussions with Combustion Engineering. 296 During 1977 and 1978, however,
Basic’s officers made a number of public announcements, including statements to
the press and public securities filings, that denied any potential merger activity.297 A
number of shareholders sold their shares of Basic stock during this period.298 Then,
in December 1978, Basic announced the pending merger with Combustion, causing
the price of its stock to rise.299 The shareholders who sold before the merger was
announced sued the company for securities fraud, alleging that the prices at which
they sold their shares would have been higher had Basic truthfully disclosed its
ongoing merger discussions before they sold their shares.300 In other words, their
returns were “artificially depressed” because of Basic’s misleading public
statements denying the merger discussions.301
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,302 ruled for the plaintiffs, adopting
the fraud-on-the-market theory in the court’s reasoning. Specifically, he accepted
the proposition that, in an efficient public securities market, all available information
will be reflected in the price of a company’s stock.303 If a misleading statement

293

Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases
Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. L. 1, 9 (1982); see Barbara Black, Fraud on
the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market
Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 437 n.7, 447–53 (1984); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient
Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907,
908–15 (1989).
294
See Black, supra note 293, at 447–53 (tracing early judicial adoption of the fraudon-the-market theory).
295
485 U.S. 224, 246–50 (1988).
296
Id. at 227.
297
Id. at 227–28.
298
Id. at 228.
299
Id. at 227–28.
300
Id. at 228.
301
Id.
302
The majority in Basic consisted of only four justices: Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens. Id. at 225. Justices White and O’Connor concurred in part and dissented in part.
Id. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case. Id.
303
Id. at 244 (“In an open and developed market, the dissemination of material
misrepresentations or withholding of material information typically affects the price of the
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artificially causes the price of the stock to change, then every purchaser or seller of
the stock at that “incorrect” price will be injured, whether or not aware of the
misleading statement.304 Such misleading statements will thus “defraud purchasers
of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements.”305 The
holding in Basic thus creates a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff relied on the
defendant’s misinformation, without actual proof of reliance.306 The fraud-on-themarket doctrine established in Basic has been applied by numerous lower courts307
and was reaffirmed by a unanimous Supreme Court in 2014.308
Judicially crafted presumptions such as the one adopted in Basic “typically
serve to assist courts in managing circumstances in which direct proof, for one
reason or another, is rendered difficult.”309 In the case of securities fraud, the Court
stock, and purchasers generally rely on the price of the stock as a reflection of its value.”
(quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986) ).
304
See id. at 228, 242 (noting that Basic’s former shareholders “alleged that they were
injured by selling Basic shares at artificially depressed prices in a market affected by
petitioners’ misleading statements and in reliance thereon”).
305
Id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61).
306
Id. at 250 (“It is not inappropriate to apply a presumption of reliance supported by
the fraud-on-the-market theory. . . . That presumption, however, is rebuttable.”).
307
See Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After Halliburton, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 896 (2013) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Basic . . . is widely
credited with spawning a vast industry of securities fraud litigation . . . .”).
308
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014). The
efficient market hypothesis has come under recent attack by corporations seeking to limit
shareholder class action suits. In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds,
133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013), in which a six-justice majority upheld the doctrine, three dissenting
justices called the decision in Basic “questionable.” Id. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
And Justice Alito, concurring in the decision, expressly suggested that “reconsideration of
the Basic presumption may be appropriate.” Id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring). In
Halliburton, however, the Court upheld the fraud-on-the-market doctrine and the
presumption of reliance in securities fraud cases, though it confirmed that a securities fraud
defendant should have the opportunity to rebut the presumption of reliance by presenting
evidence that the allegedly misleading statements had no impact on a security’s price. 134
S. Ct. at 2402, 2404.
In addition to attacks on the veracity of efficient markets hypothesis, the fraud-on-themarket theory has been challenged as a matter of statutory interpretation. Professor Joseph
Grundfest, in particular, has questioned the statutory underpinnings of the fraud-on-themarket theory. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, 69 BUS. LAW. 307, 309–19 (2014).
But even if these challenges eventually result in a narrowing or reversal of the holding
in Basic, they are particular to securities litigation and do not appear to have a significant
impact on the general argument here—that a presumption of reliance is appropriate when a
market is structured in such a way that reliance on commitments made to the market at large
is both expected and necessary for its proper functioning.
309
Basic, 485 U.S. at 245; cf. U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (2008) (“[A]ffirmations of fact
made by the seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description
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in Basic concluded that it would be exceedingly difficult for a plaintiff to prove that
he specifically relied on particular misstatements when making a decision to
purchase or sell a security.310 Given the normal efficient operation of the public
securities markets, however, a plaintiff should be entitled to rely on the market price
of a security as an accurate reflection of all public information concerning the issuer,
and a plaintiff will be presumed to have done so absent a showing that he did not so
rely (the rebuttable nature of the presumption).311
In Basic, the Court acknowledged its deviation from the standards underpinning
the traditional common law actions for fraud and deceit, which require a specific
showing of detrimental reliance by the plaintiff.312 It justified this departure from
precedent by pointing to the realities of modern securities markets “literally
involving millions of shares changing hands daily” and emphasizing how today’s
markets “differ from the face-to-face transactions” on which traditional fraud
doctrine is based.313 The Court concluded that, as a matter of “fairness” and “public
policy,” the law must evolve to accommodate this new market paradigm.314
B. A Market Reliance Theory for Patent Pledges
1. A Presumption of Reliance
Like public statements made to influence securities markets, patent pledges
have an inherently public audience. Though they may take many different forms
(e.g., clauses in agreements, provisions of SDO bylaws, declarations posted on a
web site, and subsequent clarifications of the same), all of these commitments are
intended to assure the market that products complying with a standard or using a
common technology platform may be manufactured and sold without the threat of
patent litigation. This public assurance is essential to induce firms to invest capital
of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to
weave them into the fabric of the agreement.”).
310
Basic, 485 U.S. at 245 (“Requiring a plaintiff to show a speculative state of facts,
i.e., how he would have acted if omitted material information had been disclosed, or if the
misrepresentation had not been made, would place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary
burden on the . . . plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market.” (citations omitted)).
This burden of proof would effectively have made securities class actions impossible to
bring.
311
See id. at 248 (“Any showing that severs the link between the alleged
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to
trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.”). For
example, if a company cautions the public about the reliability of information that it has
released—the “bespeaks caution” doctrine—the presumption of reasonable reliance may be
overcome. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 92 (2d ed. 2006).
312
Basic, 485 U.S. at 241–50.
313
Id. at 243–44.
314
Id. at 245.
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in standards-based technologies and thereby create positive network effects and
enhance social welfare.315
As this Article has shown, however, common law contract doctrine, rooted in
notions of bilateral bargaining and the formal requirements of mutual assent and
consideration, poorly models the diverse and public-facing character of FRAND
commitments. Antitrust law, at best, may serve as a means for addressing cases
involving deception by parties having some degree of market power. Promissory
estoppel, which focuses on the promise made by a patent holder to the public, most
accurately reflects the paradigm of patent pledges, but still requires a showing of
specific, justifiable reliance on the part of the promisee. Were this reliance
requirement relaxed, promissory estoppel could become an effective doctrinal tool
for analyzing and enforcing these commitments.
Accordingly, I propose a novel “market reliance” theory for the analysis of
FRAND commitments and other patent pledges. Under this theory, patent pledges
would be subject to a modified version of the promissory estoppel doctrine in which
there is a rebuttable presumption of reliance. This rebuttable presumption arises
from the promisor’s public statements regarding its commitments, as well as its
participation in an industry-wide activity that yields significant welfare benefits.
Following the reasoning of Basic and subsequent cases, a presumption of reliance is
appropriate when a market is structured in such a way that reliance on commitments
made to the market at large is both expected and necessary for its proper
functioning. 316 Because technology markets are dependent on FRAND
commitments and other patent pledges, this dependence is well-known to market
participants (both patent holders and potential licensees), nearly all SDOs require or
encourage FRAND licensing (at a minimum), and manufacturers of products
including industry standards or other common technology platforms are justified in
relying on the pledges that patent holders make covering such standards and
platforms. These manufacturers are also justified in making investments on that
basis. The justification for reliance echoes that described by the Court in Basic: “‘[I]t
is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on market
integrity. Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?’”317
Under the market reliance theory, it is unnecessary for a manufacturer who
seeks to enforce a patent pledge to prove that it specifically relied on the pledge
made by a specific patent holder. It is enough that the patent holder made such a
commitment to the market, and that the manufacturer is or becomes a participant in
that market by manufacturing or selling a product that uses a standard or other
315

See supra Part II.A.
See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 307, at 916–18, 931–32 (discussing the “market-based”
approach embodied by cases following Basic and advantages of such an approach over
traditional bilateral fraud determinations under the common law); John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Fraud-on-the-Market Tort, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1755, 1757 (2013)
(describing without adopting the view that “[f]raud-on-the-market claims are claims for a
public or regulatory wrong, not a traditional tort or private wrong”).
317
Basic, 485 U.S. at 246–47 (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp.
535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
316
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common technology that is subject to patent pledges. Thus, like the rebuttable
presumption of reliance in securities fraud cases, the law should recognize a
rebuttable presumption of reliance in the enforcement of patent pledges based on
market reliance.
Returning to the illustration in Part II.D.1, manufacturer Mary may wish to
release a 3D printer cartridge that complies with the I-123 standard. Mary knows
that the members of 3DPP are subject to FRAND commitments, though she may not
know specifically which 3DPP members hold which patents covering the I-123
standard. Under the market reliance theory, Mary may develop and release an I-123compliant product relying on the fact that any 3DPP member holding patents
covering the I-123 standard must grant her a license on FRAND terms. While there
may still be disagreement over the meaning of such FRAND terms,318 particularly
any associated Content Obligations, at least it is clear that Mary may compel Paul to
honor his FRAND commitments, whatever they may be. And Paul cannot evade
liability for compliance with arguments that Mary is not an intended third-party
beneficiary of Paul’s commitment or that Mary has not proven specific reliance on
Paul’s commitment. The fact that Mary is a participant in a market characterized by
patent pledges and that Paul has made a pledge within the framework of that market
is enough to allow Mary to rely on Paul’s patent pledge. Likewise, the fact that
Paul’s pledge may not be specific enough to form a binding contract with Mary does
not allow Paul to avoid complying with his promise to the greatest extent feasible.
2. Rebutting the Presumption
In securities fraud cases, the presumption of reliance created under the fraudon-the-market theory can be rebutted by evidence that the plaintiff did not, in fact,
rely on the false information disseminated to the market. As the Court explains in
Basic, “Any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and
either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair
market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.”319 For example,
the presumption of reliance will be rebutted if a market maker with accurate
knowledge of a company’s status determined the price at which the company’s stock
traded, without regard to false information disseminated by the company; the false
statements made by the company were corrected before the plaintiff transacted in
the company’s stock; the false statement can be demonstrated to have had no impact
on the price of the stock; or the plaintiff entered into a transaction for reasons
independent of the market price (e.g., it was forced to sell due to political pressure
or antitrust concerns).320 These circumstances would demonstrate that the plaintiff
did not, or could not have, relied on the false statements made by the company in
318

For a discussion of the extensive debate over the meaning of FRAND, see supra
note 22 and accompanying text.
319
Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.
320
Id. at 249.
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deciding to enter into a stock transaction. On the other hand, merely showing that
the plaintiff did not read an offering circular in which false information was
distributed does not rebut the presumption of reliance, as the company’s false
statements would still affect the market price of the stock.321 Plus, the plaintiff is
presumed to have relied on the accuracy of the market price in conducting the
transaction.322
In the case of patent pledges, an implementer’s ability to enforce a pledge
against a patent holder, and to sue for breach of that pledge, should also be subject
to a rebuttable presumption of reliance. Evidence supporting rebuttal of the
presumption might include (a) the implementer’s knowledge that the patent holder’s
patents are not valid or not essential to a standard (thus eliminating the need for a
license), (b) the patent holder’s abandonment of the patents (also eliminating the
need for a license), (c) the implementer’s entering into a license with the patent
holder (though a claim could still be brought if the implementer asserted that the
terms of that license were not FRAND), (d) the implementer’s purchase of all
necessary components implementing the standard from the patent holder’s existing
licensees (thus exhausting the patent holder’s rights in those patents), or (e) the
implementer’s unequivocal refusal to enter into good faith negotiations to obtain a
FRAND license from the patent holder (demonstrating that the implementer did not
rely on the patent holder’s promise to grant a FRAND license). Each of these cases
would potentially “sever the link” between the patent holder’s breach of its FRAND
commitment and the implementer’s failure to obtain a license under the patent
holder’s standards-essential patents, thus justifying rebuttal of the presumption of
reliance and, most likely, eliminating the implementer’s market reliance claim
against the patent holder.
3. Which Promises to Enforce?
Like both contract and promissory estoppel, the market reliance theory depends
on the making of a promise by a patent holder. A promise embodying a patent pledge
may be conveyed through a variety of different mechanisms, including an SDO
membership agreement containing a pledge, an SDO’s bylaws or policies, a letter of
assurance (LOA) submitted by a patent holder, or another form of public statement
pledging some form of conduct with respect to one or more patents. Statements and
conduct falling short of a promise, however, should not bind a patent holder under
market reliance or other theories.323
Thus, if an SDO’s policies are so ambiguous, indefinite, or incomplete that they
do not reasonably convey a promise to the other participants or to the market in
321
See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 481 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Randall, J.,
dissenting).
322
See id. at 468.
323
See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 9 (manuscript at 34–35) (“In order for a
corporate pledge to be actionable, it should be of a type that would reasonably be assumed
by the pledgor to induce action or forbearance in the pledgee.”).
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general, then an action for market reliance should not succeed.324 This situation arose
in a series of cases involving Rambus Inc., a technology developer that participated
in the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC), a voluntary SDO
developing standards for computer memory chips. Though Rambus later withdrew
from JEDEC and asserted its patents against manufacturers of devices using JEDEC
standards, the Federal Circuit exonerated Rambus of liability, observing that the
JEDEC policy suffered from “a staggering lack of defining details” that left SDO
participants with nothing but “vaguely defined expectations as to what they believe
the policy requires.”325
Likewise, a statement by a patent holder that should reasonably be construed as
a nonbinding turn of phrase, marketplace exaggeration, or mere “puffery” should
not be enforced as a patent pledge. The legal disregard for such gratuitous statements
has roots both in the law of contract and estoppel. 326 Such statements are also
discounted under federal securities laws, in which the so-called “bespeaks caution”
doctrine limits the liability of issuers for statements of opinion and estimates that are
fairly interpreted as such.327
These examples suggest that reliance on patent pledges should be justified only
to the extent that they are both clear and intended to be binding when made. Thus,
if market reliance is adopted as a mechanism for the enforcement of patent pledges,
a body of jurisprudence, agency guidelines, or private sector best practices may need
to develop surrounding the metes and bounds of enforceable pledges versus
statements that are too vague, imprecise, or insincere to be enforced.

324
See, e.g., Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1074
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (concluding that “since there was no clear and unambiguous promise by
Rambus that it would abide by the JEDEC rules, Hynix does not have a viable promissory
estoppel claim based upon Rambus’s membership in JEDEC”). The issue of indefiniteness
of commitments applies equally to estoppel and contract-based arguments. See supra Part
III.A.2.c.
325
Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
326
See 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 2.4 (rev. ed. 1993)
(stating that statements by a seller should not be considered warranties if they would “be
taken by a reasonable person to be mere ‘puffing’ or expressions of opinion”); see also
Marable v. Michael J. Auto Sales, 2013 WL 1820811, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 2013)
(holding that the buyer was not justified in claiming reliance on statements that were mere
“puffing”).
327
See, e.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993)
(“[W]hen an offering document’s forecasts, opinions or projections are accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements, the forward-looking statements will not form the basis for
a securities fraud claim if those statements did not affect the ‘total mix’ of information the
document provided investors. In other words, cautionary language, if sufficient, renders the
alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law.”). See generally
Royce de R. Barondes, The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: Revisiting the Application of
Federal Securities Law to Opinions and Estimates, 19 J. CORP. L. 243, 267 (1994)
(discussing the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Donald J. Trump).
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This is not to say, however, that in most cases it will not be possible to
determine whether a public statement made by a patent holder is of sufficient
gravity, formality, and specificity to qualify as an enforceable pledge. In fact, it is
likely that most such pledges will be easily identifiable as such. As described in Part
II.B, many patent pledges are made through formal SDO procedures that, while
falling short of the requirements for common law contract, at least evidence a clear
intent by the patent holder to be bound and induce action. Even among Type 7
pledges (Voluntary Non-SDO Declarations), many are written and either publicly
announced, posted on corporate web sites, or incorporated in correspondence with
SDOs or regulatory agencies. These pledges, too, should easily fall into the class of
enforceable promises.
Some pledges, however, may be less formal. These include statements by
corporate officers at public meetings and to the press. For example, Verizon’s
General Counsel recently stated at a recorded law school symposium that his
company would no longer sell patents to nonpracticing entities. 328 Should this
statement forever bind Verizon? Was it made with the intention that it be enforced
as a binding promise? Perhaps. But what if it were not a prepared statement (as it
appeared to be), but merely a response to a question from an audience member? And
what if it were phrased in terms of Verizon’s then-current intention, or the speaker’s
opinion, but not an official corporate position? In such cases, the courts will need to
develop a set of criteria to distinguish between enforceable patent pledges and
unenforceable statements, just as they have done with the common law doctrines of
fraud and deceit. At the end of the day, the question will be whether a particular
patent pledge was made with the intent to induce market participants to act or forego
action.
In some cases, firms may wish to signal to the market that they are making
enforceable pledges, rather than nonbinding statements of intention or opinion. They
may do so in a variety of ways, including publishing a statement on their corporate
website. Another, more permanent, vehicle for indicating that pledges are intended
to be enforceable is to register them in an online public repository maintained by a
third party. Publishing a pledge in such a repository would indicate to the public that
the patent holder wished to go “on record” as making a binding and enforceable
patent pledge.329

328

Colo. Law, Software Patents and Their Challenges Conferences: Panel Three,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 9, 2013) (statement of Randal S. Milch, Gen. Counsel, Verizon Commc’ns,
starting at 40:44), https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCQqG1L6RHJEEgDIU2rAjihg,
archived at http://perma.cc/42C4-68AA (“We have sold patents to nonpracticing entities.
That’s wrong. I shouldn’t do it. . . . I have made it clear that we are not selling anymore to
nonpracticing entities.”).
329
See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 9 (manuscript at 39–44) (proposing
registry of patent pledges).
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4. Reliance and Patent Transfers
As discussed in Part II.D.2 above, the issue of enforcing patent pledges when a
patent owner has transferred an underlying patent to a new owner has attracted
significant attention. Commentators have proposed many legal theories under which
the acquirers of patents could be bound by prior owners’ FRAND commitments and
other patent pledges, including the Section 5 approach taken by the FTC in NData,330 as well as the other antitrust and servitude theories described in Part III.331
In addition, some have suggested that SDOs are best equipped to ensure that
patent pledges travel with pledged patents by imposing policy-based requirements
on their participants who transfer patents after pledges have been made. 332 For
example, an SDO could require that its participants contractually bind any
subsequent purchasers of patents to the same pledges they have made and that each
subsequent purchaser impose a similar commitment on later purchasers. 333 This
“cascading” contractual approach depends on each purchaser in the chain imposing
the required contractual obligations on the next purchaser. Needless to say, the chain
is vulnerable to being broken by any purchaser, and if the noncompliant purchaser
is not an SDO participant, there seems to be little recourse available to implementers
left without a license. In addition, because patent acquisition transactions are
typically effected through confidential bilateral agreements, it may be difficult for
implementers to verify whether patent pledge obligations were, in fact, imposed on
downstream purchasers as required by the rules of the originating SDO.334 Finally,
echoing the concerns of Part III.A, an SDO-based cascading contractual approach
330
See Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. C-4234, 2008 WL 4407246, at *1 (F.T.C.
Sept. 22, 2008).
331
See Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks
at the ITU-T Patent Roundtable: Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch 9–11 (Oct.
10, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/287855.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/7ZSX-JEH8 (antitrust law); Kesan & Hayes, supra note 5 (equitable
servitudes).
332
See NAS REPORT, supra note 22, at 88–94 (discussing SDO strategies for making
FRAND commitments binding on subsequent purchasers of patents); ABA PATENT POLICY
MANUAL, supra note 5, at 84 (describing SDO policy language regarding transfers);
BEKKERS & UPDEGROVE, supra note 5, at 92 (finding that five of ten SDOs studied impose
requirements on transferees of patents).
333
See NAS REPORT, supra note 22, at 89–90 (describing this “cascading” licensing
obligation and discussing its implementation in the policy documents of ITU/ISO/IEC). This
approach is similar to that adopted in so-called “copy-left” open source code licenses, which
impose cascading obligations on subsequent users of an open source code program. See, e.g.,
FREE SOFTWARE FOUND., INC., GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE (2007).
334
To address this issue, some have proposed a requirement that patent transfers be
recorded with a governmental agency such as the PTO, along the lines of real property title
transfers. See NAS REPORT, supra note 23, at 90–91, 94. Such proposals are still at an early
stage of discussion and do not extend to the recordation of patent pledges that may affect
transferred patents.
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does little to address pledges made by patent holders outside a formal SDO
disclosure system (e.g., Type 6 and 7 Voluntary Declarations).
The market reliance theory proposed in this Article offers a different and more
encompassing approach to making patent pledges binding and enforceable on
subsequent purchasers. Unlike the cascading contract approach, it focuses on the
patent holder rather than the patent. If a manufacturer is sued for patent infringement,
it need not determine whether a patent pledge has been made and carried forward
with respect to each patent being asserted. Rather, it need only determine whether
the technology is part of a market characterized by patent pledges and whether the
patents being asserted were once owned by a party making a patent pledge. If so,
then the patents in the hands of the new owner (the party asserting them) should
remain subject to the original owner’s patent pledge.
While it is still incumbent on the manufacturer to discover, based on PTO
transfer and assignment records,335 some historical information regarding ownership
of the patents being asserted, it is generally easier to discover whether a particular
patent was once owned by a particular party than whether that patent is subject to a
continuing patent pledge. Moreover, enforcing such pledges based on market
reliance rather than contract eliminates the risk that a patent owner in the “chain of
title” has failed to comply with its contractual obligation to impose required
contractual limitations on downstream purchasers. 336 Therefore, market reliance
represents a more robust and reliable means of ensuring that patent pledges are
enforced against subsequent holders of pledged patents.
5. FRAND, Not Fraud
Though the market reliance theory described in this Article borrows from the
fraud-on-the-market theory under federal securities law, it is not intended to address
the same conduct as securities fraud actions. A patent holder’s failure to grant a
license on FRAND terms after it has committed to do so is markedly different than
a public company’s dissemination of false statements to the market. Patent pledges
are based on promises, and the market reliance theory is intended to recognize and
render such promises enforceable, notwithstanding the absence of formal contractual
trappings or demonstrable specific reliance. This Article borrows from the doctrine
of fraud-on-the-market only its presumption of reliance based on public statements
intended to influence market behavior, not its other elements, nor its determination
of fraud or deceit. While actions for fraud have been brought in the standards
context, they have arisen primarily in relation to allegedly deceptive conduct—

335

The PTO voluntary recordation system for patent transfers is admittedly imperfect.
See id. at 94 (stating that Recommendation 5.3 encourages more robust recordation
requirements for patent transfers).
336
See id. at 90 (raising concern over breaks in the “chain of commitment”).
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namely, a failure to disclose patents under an SDO’s policies. 337 In other cases,
claims of fraud have merely been add-ons to complaints asserting breach of contract,
estoppel, antitrust, and other claims, and have generally remained unaddressed by
the courts.338 When considered by courts, fraud claims based on the alleged violation
of FRAND commitments and other activity relating to standards development have
largely been unsuccessful.339 Thus, unless a patent holder’s conduct involves deceit,
its commitment to grant licenses on FRAND terms, and its actual or alleged failure
to do so, should not be analyzed under a fraud theory.
6. Impact Across Pledge Types
The market reliance theory proposed in this Article focuses on the public pledge
made by the patent holder, rather than the contractual relationship, if any, established
between the patent holder and the SDO/implementers. This approach addresses the
diversity of commitment structures more effectively than the application of contract
doctrine. Thus, except in the relatively rare case of Type 1 commitments (direct
contracts among SDO participants), market reliance “outperforms” common law
contract theory in terms of enforcing FRAND commitments and other patent
pledges.
One major benefit of the market reliance theory is that it eliminates the need to
distinguish between SDO members and nonmembers. Under contract theory, SDO
members are more clearly intended third-party beneficiaries than nonmembers, at
least from the SDO’s standpoint.340 Under a market reliance theory, however, all
implementers of a standard, whether or not members of the SDO, are market
participants and hence entitled to enforce the public promises made by patent
holders. That is, when FRAND commitments are embodied in agreements between
337

See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1109, 1112 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (Prost, J., dissenting in part) (alleging that Rambus deceptively concealed patenting
activity relevant to memory chip standardization in violation of SDO rules).
338
See Counterclaim Defendant Apple Inc.’s Answer, Defenses, & Counterclaims in
Reply to Samsung’s Counterclaims at 70, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 926 F. Supp.
2d 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (No. 11-CV-01846-LHK) (“Samsung’s untimely disclosures of its
claimed essential IPR and/or false FRAND commitments to ETSI, and its refusal to meet its
FRAND obligations regarding patents that it claims to be essential to the UMTS standard
constitute (1) unlawful business acts or practices in violation of the federal antitrust laws and
the California Cartwright Act, (2) fraudulent conduct and (3) unfair business acts or practices
. . . .” (emphasis added)); Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1240
(S.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that
in response to Qualcomm’s infringement claim, Broadcom raised defenses of equitable
estoppel, implied license, fraud, unclean hands, breach of contract, laches, and waiver arising
from Qualcomm’s alleged violation of its disclosure and FRAND obligations to SDO).
339
See Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1104–05 (concluding that the action for fraud failed due to
lack of clarity surrounding the defendant’s disclosure obligations to SDO); cf. supra Part
III.C.1 (discussing deception cases under antitrust theories).
340
See supra notes 149–151 and accompanying text.
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a patent holder and an SDO (Type 2), or in an SDO’s bylaws or policies (Type 3),
under common law contract theory, implementers must claim third-party beneficiary
status to enforce those commitments. While third-party beneficiary status may be
available, the application of third-party beneficiary rights to large classes of
undefined persons is subject to a long and checkered history and has lately been
disfavored by the courts.341 Relying on this doctrine for the enforcement of FRAND
commitments is thus speculative. In contrast, under the market reliance theory, the
patent holder’s promises under Type 2 and 3 structures are deemed to be made
directly to the market and implementers, who may enforce them directly without the
need to apply an intervening third-party beneficiary analysis.
Likewise, market reliance is superior to common law contract when FRAND
commitments are established by letters of assurance (Type 5) and voluntary
declarations (Type 6 and Type 7). The extension of common law contract theory to
such unilateral statements of intent is strained, at best. In some of these cases, one
can find a contractual obligation to make the relevant disclosure, but little to support
the imposition of contractual duties with regard to the content of that disclosure (e.g.,
the Content Obligation). Under a market reliance theory, however, such public
statements can be enforced as promises made to the market and its participants.
Finally, market reliance provides a means for enforcing FRAND commitments
made in the particularly confusing realm of SDOs that simply follow the ANSI
patent policy (Type 4). Finding a contractual commitment, and even an appropriate
contractual counterparty, in these cases is challenging. However, under a market
reliance theory, FRAND commitments made by patent holders to ANSI, an ANSIaccredited SDO, or the market generally should all be enforceable by market
participants.
Table 3 summarizes the applicability of common law contract versus market
reliance to each pledge type.

341

See supra Part III.A.2.b.
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Table 3
Patent Pledge Structural Variants, Contract Applicability, and Market Reliance
FRAND
Commitment
Type
1. Multilateral
Agreement

Contract Doctrine

Commitment is contractual
among members;
nonmember implementers
will have difficulty relying
on third-party beneficiary
(TPB) theory

2. Membership Commitment is contractual
Agreement
between patent holder and
SDO; member and
nonmember implementers
must rely on TPB theory

Market Reliance

Prevalence

Promise contained in private Rare
multiparty agreement is
probably not made to the
market (contract theory may
be preferable)
Promise to the market
embodied in agreement
between patent holder and
SDO is enforceable by
implementers

Uncommon

3. SDO
Commitment is either
Bylaw/policy-based promise Uncommon
Bylaws/Policy corporate or contractual in to the market is enforceable
nature; exists between
by implementers
patent holder and SDO;
member and nonmember
implementers must rely on
TPB theory
4. Follow
ANSI Policy

No affirmative FRAND
Promise to the market
Common
commitment on patent
contained in LOA is
holder, merely a
enforceable by implementers
prescription for SDO
process; LOAs provided by
members are probably not
contractual

5. Letters of
Assurance
(LOA)

Obligation to provide LOA Promise to the market
Common
is a contractual
contained in LOA is
commitment to SDO;
enforceable by implementers
commitment contained in
LOA is probably not
contractual

6. Voluntary
SDO
Declarations

Voluntary licensing
declarations are almost
certainly not contractual

Promise to the market
Rare
contained in voluntary
declaration is enforceable by
implementers

7. Voluntary
Non-SDO
Declarations

No contract

Treated as promises with
binding effect

Uncommon
but
increasing
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7. Remedies
One of the most vexing issues associated with the enforcement of FRAND
commitments and other patent pledges is how to fashion a remedy when such
commitments are breached. 342 The customary remedy to redress the breach of a
promise rendered enforceable through promissory estoppel is an award of monetary
“expectation” damages.343 As with common law contracts, expectation damages are
intended to restore the injured party to the position in which it would have been save
for the breach. 344 Yet monetary damages awarded to an unlicensed party do not
achieve the primary purpose of patent pledges: assuring the market that patents will
not be asserted to prevent the implementation of industry standards or common
technology platforms. 345 To fulfill the purpose of the pledge and promote the
widespread adoption of the relevant technology or standard, a license must be
granted on the promised terms. In other words, specific performance must be
awarded.
As the Restatement (Second) explains, “An order of specific performance is
intended to produce as nearly as is practicable the same effect that the performance
due under a contract would have produced.”346 To achieve this purpose, the terms of
the contract to be enforced must be sufficiently clear for the court to grant relief.347
A contract that is indefinite, or a mere agreement to agree, is not amenable to
enforcement by specific performance.348
342

A remedy would be sought only when the potential infringer asserts breach of a
patent pledge as an affirmative cause of action. It is also likely, however, that market reliance
may be raised as a defense against a claim of infringement, in which case dismissal of the
infringement claim would be the principal relief sought.
343
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. a, d (1981).
344
See id. § 347 cmt. a.
345
This is not to say that monetary damages should be entirely out of the question to
address injuries suffered by a product vendor that was improperly denied a license in
violation of a patent pledge. Such damages could cover, for example, lost profits during the
period that the vendor refrained from selling a standardized product due to the lack of a
license.
346
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. a (1981).
347
Id. § 362 (“Specific performance . . . will not be granted unless the terms of the
contract are sufficiently certain to provide a basis for an appropriate order.”); see also id. §
362 cmt. b, illus. 1 (“A and B make a contract under which A promises to convey part of a
tract of land to B and B promises to pay $100,000 and to build ‘a first class theatre’ on it.
Building the theatre will enhance the value of A’s remaining land. A conveys the land to B,
who pays the price but refuses to build the theatre. A sues B for specific performance.
Specific performance will be refused because of the uncertainty of the terms of the contract,
although A can receive damages from B based on the failure to enhance the value of his land
if he can prove them with reasonable certainty.”).
348
See, e.g., Sanderford v. Duplin Land Dev., Inc., 531 F. App’x. 358, 362 (4th Cir.
2013) (stating that “a contract ‘leaving material portions open for future agreement is
nugatory and void for indefiniteness,’” and specific performance will not be awarded
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In the case of patent pledges, and FRAND commitments in particular, it is
useful to recall the distinction between Process Obligations and Content
Obligations. 349 Process Obligations are commitments to go through the process
leading to the grant of a FRAND license or some other required outcome. Content
Obligations relate to the content of the license that is actually granted, including both
royalty rates and other terms such as reciprocal license commitments, defensive
suspension, and the like.350 As discussed above, FRAND commitments and other
patent pledges relating to the granting of licenses (e.g., royalty-free license
commitments) are seldom specific as to content, and it is unlikely that specific
performance would be granted imposing specific license terms on the parties.351 As
the oft-repeated maxim states, a court will not “make a contract for the parties.”352
With respect to Process Obligations, however, the court is more likely to
succeed in fashioning a suitable order for specific performance. In doing so, it has
several options. First, it could order the parties to negotiate and reach an agreement
on the terms of a FRAND license agreement. This option, of course, leaves open the
question of what happens if the parties cannot agree on those terms (which may not
be unlikely if they are in litigation).353 Second, the court may itself determine certain
key license terms (such as royalty rate) and order the parties to fashion an agreement
(quoting Cnty. of Jackson v. Nichols, 623 S.E.2d 277, 279 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005))); Quirin v.
Weinberg, 830 P.2d 537, 541 (Mont. 1992) (“[A] contract to be specifically enforceable must
be complete and certain in all essential matters included within its scope. Nothing must be
left to conjecture or surmise, or be so vague as to make it impossible for the court to glean
the intent of the parties from the instrument . . . .” (quoting Steen v. Rustad, 313 P.2d 1014,
1020 (Mont. 1957)); Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541,
543–44 (N.Y. 1981) (“[M]ere agreement to agree, in which a material term is left for future
negotiations, is unenforceable. . . . [And this] rule applies all the more, and not the less, when
. . . the extraordinary remedy of specific performance is sought.” (citations omitted)); Duke
v. Tobin, 96 S.E.2d 758, 760 (Va. 1957) (“[A] court of equity will not specifically enforce a
contract unless it be complete and certain. All the essential terms of the contract must be
finally and definitely settled. None must be left to be determined by future negotiations.”).
The inability to specifically enforce indefinite agreements has been codified in the statutes
of some states. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-412(5) (2013) (stating that “an agreement
the terms of which are not sufficiently certain to make the precise act which is to be done
clearly ascertainable” cannot be specifically enforced).
349
See supra Part II.C.
350
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
351
This is not the case, however, with respect to patent pledges relating to specific
commitments, such as pledges to refrain from seeking injunctions or from transferring
pledged patents to nonpracticing entities. These commitments are likely definite enough to
support specific performance.
352
Three-O-Three Inv. Inc. v. Moffitt, 622 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
(quoting Biggs v. Moll, 463 S.W.2d 881, 887 (Mo. 1971)).
353
See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-cv-178-bbc, 2012 WL 5416941,
at *4 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 29, 2012) (concluding that “it makes little sense to order the parties to
continue negotiating a license when they have been unable to reach an agreement through
five years of negotiations”).
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around those key terms. 354 Third, the court could order the parties to submit to
binding arbitration to fashion a license agreement, including its key terms. This third
approach has the benefit of removing the not insubstantial burden of determining
royalty rates and other licensing terms from the court and placing it in the hands of
a qualified third party compensated by the litigants.355 And finally, courts could look
to some combination of judicial or arbitral determinations of key license terms, such
as royalty rates, and require that other terms of FRAND licenses comply with a
known industry template agreement.356 While no such template agreement has yet
been widely accepted for FRAND licensing, the development of such a template
would not be difficult.357 Thus, a variety of options exist for the granting of specific
354

This option is closer to what the court initially ordered in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola,
Mobility, Inc. See id. (determining that “it makes sense to allow Apple to sue for specific
performance of Motorola’s contractual obligations and for the court to determine license
terms, if necessary. In fact, in situations such as this in which the parties cannot agree on the
terms of a fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory license, the court may be the only forum
to determine license terms”). In a surprising turn of events, however, Apple announced that
it would not commit to enter into a license agreement with Motorola at any rate the court
determined. Rather, Apple would “consider” the court’s royalty rate, but reserved the right,
if the rate exceeded $1.00 per product, to continue with litigation. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola
Mobility, Inc., No. 11-cv-178-bbc, 2012 WL 5416931, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2012). In
light of Apple’s position, the court reconsidered Apple’s petition for specific performance,
which asked “whether it was appropriate for a court to undertake the complex task of
determining a FRAND rate if the end result would be simply a suggestion that could be used
later as a bargaining chip between the parties.” Id. The court’s answer was negative: it reversed
its earlier decision and denied Apple’s motion for specific performance. Id.
355
Arbitration of disputes concerning standards-essential patents has gained significant
currency recently and has been noted with approval in the FTC’s consent order in Motorola
Mobility, LLC, No. 121-0120, 2013 WL 124100, at *11–12 (F.T.C. Jan. 3, 2013), as well as
the European Commission’s settlement with Samsung, see Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1160 (2013); Jorge L. Contreras & David L. Newman,
Developing a Framework for Arbitrating Standards-Essential Patent Disputes, 2014 J. DISP.
RESOL. 23, 23; Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Standard Setting Organizations Can Help Solve the
Standard Essential Patents Licensing Problem, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Mar. 2013, at 2, 4;
EC Google/Motorola Mobility Decision, supra note 239; EC Samsung Press Release, supra
note 239 (noting that arbitrators, in addition to courts, are “well equipped” to determine
FRAND-compliant reasonable royalty rates); Hesse, supra note 331, at 10.
356
Courts have also shown a willingness to grant specific performance of incomplete
bargains that involve the use of template agreements. See, e.g., Wolvos v. Meyer, 668 N.E.2d
671, 676–77 (Ind. 1996) (ordering specific performance of a real estate purchase option when
the parties had agreed on a description of the property, the purchase price, and a time frame
for closing, and consented to the use of a standardized real estate purchase form to
memorialize their agreement).
357
Standardized contracts developed through collaborative mechanisms can both
reduce transaction costs and assure balanced treatment of issues. See Mark R. Patterson,
Standardization of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition and Contract Implications, 52
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performance of patent pledges enforced through the market reliance theory proposed
in this Article.
8. Implementing Theory in Law
The market reliance theory and its rebuttable presumption of reliance represent
a modest, albeit critical, modification to the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the
WM. & MARY L. REV. 327, 377–80 (2010). Industry-specific template agreements have been
adopted successfully in a number of different markets from online advertising, e.g., Terms
and Conditions, INTERACTIVE ADVER. BUREAU, http://www.iab.net/guidelines/508676/tscs
3, archived at http://perma.cc/MVU9-X3YN (last visited Feb. 4, 2015), to residential real
estate, e.g., CAL. ASS’N OF REALTORS, SAN FRANCISCO PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND JOINT
ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS (2011), available at http://www.car.org/media/pdf/legal/standardforms/507939/, archived at http://perma.cc/7QHH-2N4D. In addition, standardized
intellectual property license agreements, most notably the Creative Commons suite of
content licenses, see About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, www.creativecommons.org
/licenses/, archived at http://perma.cc/H4RV-6RX4 (last visited Feb. 4, 2015), have gained
widespread acceptance.
While a detailed program for the development of an industry standard FRAND license
template is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that there are several neutral
bodies that could act as facilitators for such a project. For example, a committee of the
American Bar Association (ABA) acted as the facilitator in drafting the Model Trading
Partner Agreement for Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), which has become the de facto
standard for EDI transactions. See JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, LAW OF
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, at 5-62 (4th ed. 2012); Elec. Messaging Servs. Task Force, The
Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange—A Report and Model Trading Partner
Agreement, 45 BUS. LAW. 1645, 1649 (1990). The ABA has also been active in the area of
technical standardization, and two of its committees have produced reference works that are
widely used in the field. See ABA PATENT POLICY MANUAL, supra note 5; ABA ANTITRUST
HANDBOOK, supra note 198. Another potential facilitator is ANSI, which represents the
interests of the U.S. standards community and has approximately 230 SDO members. See
About ANSI, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/overview/over
view.aspx?menuid=1, archived at http://perma.cc/5BBT-R9VF (last visited Feb. 4, 2015);
Domestic Programs (American National Standards) Overview, AM. NAT’L STANDARDS
INST., http://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/domestic_programs/overview.aspx?menuid
=3, archived at http://perma.cc/HQC6-ZAL2 (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). As discussed above,
the ANSI Essential Requirements form is the basis for many SDO patent policies, lending
substantial legitimacy to any such ANSI-led activity. See supra text accompanying notes 72–
74. ANSI also has a well-organized Intellectual Property Rights Policy Committee that
represents a broad cross section of the standardization community, and it meets regularly and
forms task groups to address issues of interest to the membership. Intellectual Property
Rights
Policy
Committee
(IPRPC),
AM.
NAT’L
STANDARDS
INST.,
http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/structure_management/policy_commit_councils/intel_right
s.aspx?menuid=1, archived at http://perma.cc/7LN7-E6YS (last visited Feb. 4, 2015).
Finally, it is possible that a neutral governmental agency such as the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) could convene such an effort and help to ensure that its
results were acceptable to a broad range of constituents.
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context of patent pledges. The clearest path to adoption of such a presumption would
be through judicial recognition.358 Courts are well equipped to develop common law
doctrine and have done so for centuries. The doctrines of promissory estoppel and
the common law of contracts are both the products of gradual judicial development.
In contrast, the rapid judicial recognition of the fraud-on-the-market theory was
remarkable given the centuries of common law precedent surrounding actions for
fraud and deceit. 359 Nevertheless, the courts, when confronted with a legal
framework that was ill-suited to address the realities of modern markets, recognized
the need to adapt these traditional common law rules with contemporary theory and
supporting empirical data. It is hoped that courts considering cases involving
FRAND commitments and other patent pledges may find the market reliance theory
useful and adopt it as a general theory for enforcing patent pledges.
While judicial recognition of the market reliance doctrine would help to address
current uncertainty, judicial adoption occurs sporadically as cases are brought, and
there is no assurance that such adoption would be rapid or widespread.360 A more
general and timely solution could potentially be achieved through legislative action.
As noted throughout this Article, patent pledges, and FRAND commitments in
particular, are key elements of the technology infrastructure. As such, they should
be as strongly and transparently enforceable as possible. Legislation clarifying that
such commitments are enforceable promises and establishing by statute the
presumption of reliance that is proposed in this Article, as well as the binding effect
of patent pledges on subsequent purchasers of pledged patents, would significantly
benefit the technology marketplace by reducing uncertainty and litigation.361 Such

358

Cf. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 104–06 (2009) (arguing that in the area of patent law, judicial rather than
legislative solutions are more likely to be effective and within reach).
359
See supra notes 293–295 and accompanying text (noting the rapid adoption of the
fraud-on-the-market theory in judicial decisions).
360
As noted above, judicial recognition of the fraud-on-the-market theory, which was
regarded as remarkably quick, took over a decade.
361
The operative language of such legislation would be relatively straightforward. For
example:
SEC. X. ENFORCEMENT OF PATENT PLEDGES.
(a) Definitions.—In this section—
(1) the term ‘covered person’ means a person who has an interest in the
manufacture, sale, use, or import of a product or process that would, or is likely
to, infringe a patent subject to a patent pledge, either directly or contributorily, or
that would induce infringement of such patent;
(2) the term ‘patent pledge’ means a statement, commitment, promise, or
pledge made by a controlling party regarding the licensing or nonassertion of a
patent (including a patent not yet issued at the time the patent pledge is made),
whether the patent is specifically identified or part of a defined group or portfolio
of patents, that is—
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legislation could be effected through a relatively modest amendment to the Patent
Act; 362 the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004
(SDOAA),363 a statute enacted a decade ago to insulate SDOs from certain antitrust
claims; or one of the several bills currently proposed to address various aspects of
the U.S. patent system.364
In addition to judicial and legislative recognition of the market reliance theory,
either federal agencies or Congress may wish to consider legal incentives to
encourage firms to make patent pledges, or to register them in a public repository as
discussed in Part IV.B.3 above. Such incentives might include lessening the antitrust
penalties for allegedly anticompetitive conduct involving pledged patents,365 akin to
the relief from treble damages available to SDOs under the Standards Development
Organization Advancement Act.366
V. CONCLUSION
Patent pledges are intended to preserve the many social welfare benefits
afforded by the broad adoption of interoperability standards and other technology
(A) made to the public or in a manner intended to be known by the public;
and
(B) intended to be binding on the controlling party; and
(3) the term ‘controlling party’ shall include any owner, assignee, transferee,
licensee, or other person having the authority to license or enforce a patent.
(b) Binding Effect.—A patent pledge shall be binding upon and obligate (i)
the controlling party originally making such patent pledge and (ii) any subsequent
controlling party to the same degree as the controlling party that originally made
the patent pledge.
(c) Enforcement.—A covered person may bring a civil action to enforce a
patent pledge against any controlling party that is bound by such patent pledge
pursuant to subsection (b).
(d) Presumption of Reliance.—A covered person shall not be required to
demonstrate actual reliance on a patent pledge in order to succeed in enforcement
under subsection (c).
362

35 U.S.C. §§ 1–42 (2012).
Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (2004) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
4301–06 (2012)).
364
See, e.g., Jimmy Hoover, Patent Reform to Get New Life in GOP-Led Congress,
LAW 360 (Jan. 29, 2014, 1:34 PM), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/616444?utm_source
=shared-articles&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=shared-articles,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/ZLN3-3VVR (discussing bills likely to emerge in the 115th Congress); see
also Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013) (including provisions relating to
disclosure of the real parties in interest, discovery and joinder, and fee shifting, and
correcting several defects in the America Invents Act); Patent Litigation Integrity Act of
2013, S. 1612, 113th Cong. (2013) (seeking “[t]o deter abusive patent litigation by targeting
the economic incentives that fuel frivolous lawsuits”).
365
See supra Part III.C.
366
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–06 (2012).
363
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platforms by assuring the market that patents will not be used to block the
manufacture and sale of products conforming to such standards. As such, it is critical
that FRAND commitments and other patent pledges be binding and enforceable.
However, the currently prevailing contractual understanding of commitments is both
inaccurate and incomplete. While the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel
more closely hews to the nature of such commitments, its requirement of actual
detrimental reliance is problematic.
This Article recognizes the public character of FRAND commitments with a
novel “market reliance” theory that combines aspects of traditional promissory
estoppel with the federal securities fraud-on-the-market doctrine. This approach,
which focuses on a patent holder’s reliance-inducing statements to the market at
large, avoids the artificial application of inapposite doctrinal constructs to promises
that do not fit the contractual mode. It would make patent pledges binding and
enforceable whether made in an SDO setting or in a broader statement to the market,
and it would make such pledges enforceable against subsequent purchasers of
pledged patents. Recognizing patent pledges as the market-wide assurances they are
intended to be, whether through the courts or Congress, will create a stronger and
more defensible foundation for the enforcement of these crucial commitments.

